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THE "PROGRESS CLAUSE": AN E1IPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF PATENT LAW
Lori B. Andrews*
When the Founding Fathers promulgated the Progress Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, they recognized the potential for certain
types of patents to impede rather than promote innovation. The
drafting of the Patent Act and its interpretation by the U.S.
Supreme Court similarly recognized that abstract ideas, laws of
nature, and products of nature do not represent patentable
inventions and that innovation requires that these tools be
available to all researchers. In three recent cases, the Supreme
Court has revisited the Progress Clause. Its most recent case on
the issue, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., raises not only legal issues, but also empirical ones. This
Article puts the goals of the Progress Clause in context by
analyzing all of the studies that have addressed whether gene
patents promote or impede progress. It demonstrates that the
Founders' concerns were warranted and an exemption for abstract
ideas, laws of nature, and products of nature is necessary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Founding Fathers were drafting the U.S.
Constitution, they thought about how best to encourage innovation
in their new nation. The result was the Progress Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. The Progress Clause
provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries ......1 This clause, designed to reward
the creation and sharing of new knowledge, is the constitutional
basis for the intellectual property system in existence today.
The nation's Founders engaged in extensive analyses about the
scope of the clause and its appropriate limits. Thomas Jefferson,
the first administrator of the patent system and author of the 1793
Patent Act, was concerned about the power of monopolies over
science.2 He stated, "Considering the exclusive right to invention
as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society, I know
well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and
those which are not." 3 Jefferson was adamant that abstract ideas, as
well as the handiwork of nature, not be restricted by patents. He
wrote:
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 SETH SHULMAN, OWNING THE FUTURE 29 (1999).
3 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181 (Henry A. Washington ed.).
Similarly, for Nobel Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz, the issue is not
"whether the patent system encourages or discourages innovation.... [but]
whether the particular category of patents under discussion does so, and does so
to a sufficient extent to justify the large social costs of the restrictions on the use
of knowledge and the extension of monopoly power." Declaration of Joseph E.
Stiglitz 40, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010) (No. 09-4515). Stiglitz identifies three ways gene
patents such as those at issue in Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO
impede basic research: (1) the "patent race" to patent particular genetic
sequences reduced the available public funds for other research; (2) the "socially
unproductive race to be first" to patent genes diverted scarce talent from other
more productive pursuits; and most significantly (3) gene patents pose a
substantial impediment to follow up research. Id. at 37-39.
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That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for
the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by
nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space,
without lessening their destiny in any point, and like the air in which
we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation.4
Patents are not granted for all useful products or processes that
result from human ingenuity. For instance, mental processes and
abstract ideas are not patentable because "they are ... basic tools
of scientific and technological work."' Patenting other raw
materials of scientific and technological work, such as laws of
nature or products of nature, similarly raises the danger of
inhibiting future innovation and "foreclose[ing] more future
invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify."6
In a series of cases over the past 150 years, the Supreme Court
has held that one cannot patent abstract ideas, laws of nature,
products of nature, or materials isolated from products of nature if
those materials behave in the same way they would in nature.' In
1853, when Samuel Morse convinced the Patent Office to grant
him a patent on all uses of electromagnetic waves to write at a
distance, the Supreme Court said that he could not patent the law
of nature that covers every such use of electromagnetic waves.' He
could only patent his invention-the telegraph.9
The Supreme Court, in O'Reilly v. Morse,10 was concerned that
granting Morse broad rights to a law of nature beyond his
4 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966) (quoting
6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (Henry A. Washington ed.)).
' Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
6 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1292
(2012).
7 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980); Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); American Fruit
Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1931); Cochrane v. Badische
Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884); American Wood-Paper Co. v.
Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 594 (1874); O'Reilly v. Morse,
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-21, 132 (1853).
'Morse, 56 U.S. at 113.
9 Id.
10 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
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particular invention would overcompensate him by giving him
rights to subsequent inventions that he did not himself create:
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or
machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know
some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a
mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or
galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination
set forth in the plaintiffs specification. His invention may be less
complicated-less liable to get out of order-less expensive in
construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent
the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it
without the permission of this patentee.
Nor is this all, while he shuts the door against inventions of other
persons, the patentee would be able to avail himself of new discoveries
in the properties and powers of electro-magnetism which scientific men
might bring to light."
In 1980, the first Supreme Court case dealing with
biotechnology made clear that the exemption is just as relevant in
the modem biotech age. Diamond v. Chakrabartyl2 involved a
man-made (genetically engineered) bacterium, which the Court
carefully described as not naturally occurring.13 In that case, the
Court stated:
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been
held not patentable. Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a
new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise,
Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could
Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are
"manifestations of . .. nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively
to none." 14
The Chakrabarty Court held that an invention from a product of
nature is only patentable if it is "markedly different" from nature."
The reason it is important not to have patents on products of nature
or laws of nature is that it would give inventors "too much patent
" Id. at 113.
12 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
13 Id. at 309.
14 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
" Id. at 3 10.
JUNE 2014] 541
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
protection" and "impede rather than 'promote. . .' the constitutional
objective of patent and copyright protection."16
In three recent cases-Bilski v. Kappos,1 Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.," and Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.19-the Supreme Court
reiterated that some patents can thwart innovation. Myriad, the
most recent decision, provides the perfect case study about whether
a particular class of patents impedes or promotes progress. Myriad
focuses on whether the claimed inventions-isolated human
genes-are "markedly different" from products of nature.2 0 In
addition to extensive briefing about whether there was sufficient
human ingenuity involved to consider an isolated human gene a
patentable invention,2 1 the affidavits and amicus briefs in the case
gathered all existing data on whether gene patents encourage or
discourage innovation. Over ninety affidavits were filed,22
including two from Nobel Laureates.2 3 Over 102 amicus groups
filed briefs arguing for the invalidation of gene patents,2 4 including
medical organizations such as the American Medical Association25
and patient advocacy groups such as the March of Dimes.26
Industry organizations such as the Biotechnology Industry
16 Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
126-27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)
(emphasis in original).
17 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
18 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
19 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
20 Id. at 2109.
21 Brief for Petitioners, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc. (Myriad), 133 S. Ct. 2107 (Jan. 23, 2013) (No. 12-398); Brief for
Respondents, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (Mar. 7, 2013) (No. 12-398).
22 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (USPTO), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
23 Declaration of Joseph E. Stiglitz, supra note 3; Declaration of Sir John E.
Sulston, USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2009) (No. 09-4515).
24 Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 20, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (Sept. 24,
2012) (No. 12-398).
2 Brief for American Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (Jan. 29, 2013) (No. 12-398).
26 Brief for March of Dimes Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (Jan. 31, 2013) (No. 12-398).
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Organization filed briefs arguing that gene patents were valid.27
Also weighing in were prominent scientists, various companies,
numerous law professors, and the intellectual property bar. The
briefs and affidavits submitted in the case cover every study
undertaken about the impact of human gene patents. These
analyses provide the ideal raw material for a conceptual
exploration of how to determine whether the allowance of patents
on a particular class of materials furthers or hinders progress, and
to discern how to draw the line between unpatentable and
patentable subject matter.
In Part II, this Article analyzes the patent system and courts'
roles in addressing patent subject matter eligibility. Part III
explains what gene patents cover. Part IV outlines some of the
special challenges that genes raise for patent law and why it might
be expected that patents on genes might impede innovation. Part V
assesses the effects of gene patents on innovation, including:
(1) the role human gene patents play in assuring the initial
innovation of identifying genetic sequences; (2) the role human
gene patents play in sequential innovation such as the undertaking
of epidemiological research, creation of diagnostic kits, and
development of new treatments to prevent or ameliorate genetic
diseases; and (3) the impact of gene patents on researchers' and
research subjects' willingness to participate in research. The
concluding section assesses whether gene patents are likely to
encourage or restrict innovation-that is, whether or not they
"promote progress." That analysis concludes that the rationale
behind the Progress Clause supports the Court's assessment that
genes are unpatentable products of nature.
II. THE PATENT SYSTEM AND PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Patents are designed as a government-granted privilege and not
as a right entitled to inventors for their discoveries.2 8 As the
27 Brief for Amicus Curiae The Biotechnology Indus. Org. in Support of
Respondents, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (Mar. 14, 2013) (No. 12-398).
2 See David B. Resnik & Kenneth A. De Ville, Bioterrorism and Patent
Rights: "Compulsory Licensure" and the Case of Cipro, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 29
(2002); Kayhan P. Parsi & Erin A. Egan, The Public Interest versus the Private
Privilege, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 45 (2002).
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Supreme Court has noted, the patent privilege is powerful in that
its "very exclusivity can impede the flow of information that might
permit, indeed spur, invention."2 9 Thus, a foundational question in
analyzing patent eligibility is whether a class of patents will
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."3 0
The mechanism by which Congress chose to encourage
innovation was to grant an inventor a patent-a monopoly on any
use of the patented invention in exchange for a disclosure in the
patent application of how the invention can be made. This is
thought to encourage innovation by stimulating people to invent in
the first place, often by making a better, cheaper, more interesting,
and more effective alternative to an existing invention.3 1 Thus, if a
person patents a mousetrap made of wood, when the patent
application later becomes public (a condition of the patent grant),3 2
other inventors can read about how the inventor made the
mousetrap and can create variations using significantly different
materials or processes.
Under the Patent Act, a patent is a limited legal monopoly
given to an inventor who meets certain constitutional and statutory
requirements.33 The invention must be novel,3 4 non-obvious,3 5 and
useful.36 But Section 101 of the Patent Act and the Progress Clause
in the Constitution also require an assessment that the purported
invention is not an abstract idea, law of nature, or product of
nature.37 Simply meeting the requirements of non-obviousness,
29 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305
(2012).
30 Brief for Int'l. Ctr. for Tech. Assessment et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 19, Ass'n. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406).
31 See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116.
32 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
33 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-05 (2006).
34 35 U.S.C. § 102.
35 35 U.S.C. § 103.
36 The patent application must have a detailed written description of the
invention and must demonstrate how to make the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 101; 35
U.S.C. § 112.
37 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293
(2012).
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novelty, and usefulness is not enough because, for example, a
product of nature (such as a new mineral discovered in the ground)
might meet all three and yet not be an "invention."3 8 This is true no
matter how much money or intellect is spent finding this mineral.
Justice Breyer has discussed the reason why it is important not to
have patents on products of nature or laws of nature. He said:
The justification for the principle [that products of nature or laws of
nature are not patentable] does not lie in any claim that "laws of nature"
are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful.
To the contrary, research into such matters may be costly and time-
consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and the fruits of those
incentives and that research may prove of great benefit to the human
race. Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much
patent protection can impede rather than "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts," the constitutional objective of patent and
copyright protection.39
For twenty years from the date of the filing of the patent
application, a patent holder controls any use of its invention and
can prevent anyone else from using, making, selling, or importing
the invention.4 0 The patent holder can keep an invention away from
the public altogether. The inventor can decide that he will be the
only one to sell the invention and charge as much as he wants for
the invention. Or the inventor can, for royalty fees, grant exclusive
rights to a single licensee to use the invention or make the
invention available for royalty fees in a non-exclusive fashion to
all comers.
Unlike in copyright law, there is no patent law exception for
fair use.4 1 Unlike patent law in other countries, 42 there is no general
statutory research exception in the United States. 43 Infringement is
a strict liability concept and it is not necessary to prove intent to
3 8 Id.
39 Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
126-27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
40 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
41 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (fair use exception to copyright).
42 Jordan Paradise & Christopher Janson, Decoding the Research Exemption,
7 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 148, 148 (2006).
43 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
539 U.S. 958 (2003).
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infringe. 44 In general, only infringers and potential infringers-and
not third parties-have a right to challenge a patent in court. 45
Under American patent law, an inventor can refuse to make the
invention and forbid others from making it. In contrast, under
American trademark law, a person can lose the mark if he does not
use it for three years. 4 6 And in Europe, patent holders are required
to "work" the patent and make the invention available or else their
rights are constricted. 47
The American patent system is a three-way give-and-take
among the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), the
courts, and Congress. All three have active roles in assuring that
the goals of the patent system are met and that the monopoly
granted is not too broad. Often this means that Congress and the
courts winnow back patents erroneously granted by the USPTO. 48
Between 25% and 75% of litigated patents are found invalid during
litigation, sometimes because their scope is so broad that they
cover unpatentable subject matter such as abstract ideas, laws of
nature, or products of nature. 4 9 Sometimes the director of the
' Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
45 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-34 (2007); Ass'n
for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated,
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012),
remanded, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. granted, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
46 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
47 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
art. 30(b)(31), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (Dec. 15, 1993).
48 See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
49 See Paul M. Janicke et al., PATSTATS: U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics,
UNIV. OF HOUSTON PATSTATS, http://www.patstats.org/editorspage.rev6.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2014) (reporting that from 2000 through 2006, 43% of
validity issues reported by American courts found the involved claims invalid);
Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2006) (reporting that 75% of patent cases litigated at the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals between 2002 and 2004 resulted in a
dispositive decision in favor of the accused infringer); John R. Allison & Mark
A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA
Q.J. 185 (1998) (reporting that 46% of litigated patents from early 1989 through
1996 where validity was an issue were found invalid); Donald R. Dunner, J.
Michael Jakes & Jeffrey D. Karceski, Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's
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USPTO has had to review and invalidate provisions of improperly
granted patents-50 this has happened, for example, with patents on
certain computer programs.1 In other instances, Congress has
stepped in-for example, by exempting doctors from patent
infringement liability if they use a patented medical or surgical
procedure.5 2
One might think that the Constitution allows patents on certain
products of nature, because Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 speaks of
exclusive rights to "discoveries."53 In the case of gene patents, the
patent holder has discovered the gene sequence. However, the term
"discoveries," at the time Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 was
written, meant the creation of something new, synonymous with
our modem term "invention."5 4 In the late eighteenth century, the
terms "invention" and "discovery" both referred to the creation of
something original. As Demaine and Fellmeth explain:
An "invention," in the parlance of the Constitution and early patent
laws, is a new creation consciously sought and successfully reduced to
practice by the inventor. A "discovery," as used in the same parlance,
was intended to denote a fortuitous creation of the inventor and not
merely something found by him or her. Thus, an "invention" and a
"discovery" share the requirement that the inventor create something
original; the difference between the two is that an "invention" is
consciously sought, while a "discovery" is created unexpectedly. A
Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151 (1995) (reporting that 25% of
patents appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals between 1982 until
1994 had no valid claims).
50 Ex Parte Reexamination at the Initiative of the Director, 37 C.F.R. § 1.520
(2013).
5 David Kappos, Director, USPTO, An Examination of Software Patents,
Keynote Address at the Center for American Progress (Nov. 20, 2012),
available at http://www. uspto.gov/news/speeches/2012/kapposCAP.jsp.
52 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006) (exempting doctors from patent infringement
liability if they use a patented medical or surgical procedure).
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54 Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix:
A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55
STAN. L. REv. 303, 370 (2002). The authors firther provide that the difference
between a discovery and invention was that the first is the unexpected creation
of something new, while the second is consciously sought. Id.
55 Id. (citing 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 453 (James A.H. Murray ed.
1901)).
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discovery in that era, as used in the intellectual property law, denoted
something originating from the human intellect and not merely learned
by that intellect.56
Writing in 1889, another patent law scholar noted that someone
"may invent a machine, and may discover an island or law of
nature.57 For doing the first . . . , the patent laws may reward him,
because he is an inventor . . . ; but those laws cannot reward him
for doing either of the others, because he is not an inventor in
doing either."" Mere "discovery" (as we use the term today) of a
natural entity has never been patentable.
The observation that the drafters of the Constitution viewed
discoveries as a type of invention is supported in the text of the
first Patent Act. The Patent Act of 1793 specifically stated that
"simply changing the form or the proportions of any machine, or
composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a
discovery."5 9 Although the Patent Act of 195260 does not
specifically contain this language, it is considered by both
Congress6 1 and the Supreme Court6 2 to merely codify all earlier
patent acts.
56 Id. (citing 2 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 6:2, at 6 (3d. ed. 1984)).
57 ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA § 2, at 2 (L.K. Strouse & Co., 2d ed. 1889).
58Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 54, at 370 (citing ALBERT H. WALKER,
TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §2, at 2
(L.K. Strouse & Co.: New York, 2d ed. 1889)).
59 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, §2, 1 Stat. 318-323 (Feb. 21, 1793) (current
version at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952)).
60 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
61 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2397 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394.
62 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The Court stated that
"The Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson, defined statutory
subject matter as 'any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereofl.' Act of Feb. 21, 1793, §
1, 1 Stat. 319. The Act embodied Jefferson's philosophy that 'ingenuity should
receive a liberal encouragement.' 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 76
(Washington ed. 1871). See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10
(1966). Subsequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 employed this same
broad language. In 1952, when the patent laws were recodified, Congress
replaced the word 'art' with 'process,' but otherwise left Jefferson's language
intact. The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that
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In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,6 3 the Supreme
Court, in dicta, addressed the need for a "discovery" to have a new
and useful aspect be afforded patent protection as an "invention:"
The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his
natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement,
to bring forth new knowledge. The grant of an exclusive right to an
invention was the creation of society at odds with the inherent free
nature of disclosed ideas-and was not to be freely given. Only
inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and
were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited
private monopoly. 64
The patent laws of many other leading countries also distinguish
"discoveries" from "inventions."65 The British Patents Act of 1977
provides that "a discovery, scientific theory or mathematical
Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun
that is made by man.' S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R.
Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)." Id. at 308-09.
63 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
64 Id. at 9.
65 The European Patent Convention ("EPC") requires such an "inventive
step," excluding mere "discoveries" from patentable subject matter. European
Patent Convention, art. 52, Nov. 29, 2000. The EPC offers that "discoveries,
scientific theories and mathematical methods" are not regarded as patentable
subject material. See id. Likewise, the European Directive on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions provides that "the simple discovery of
one of [the] elements [of the human body] or one of its products, including the
sequence or partial sequence of a human gene, cannot be patented" and that "a
mere discovery cannot be patented" because inventions must involve an
"inventive step." Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions,
art.16, 1998; see, e.g., European Patent Convention, art. 52 (Nov. 29, 2000);
1995. 6vi XXXIII. t6rv6ny a talilminyok szabadalmi oltalmir6l (Law on the
Protection of Inventions by Patents), art. 1, § 2(a) (Hung.) (noting that
"discoveries, scientific theories, and mathematical methods" are not patentable);
see also Carlos M. Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New
Technologies, 20 WISC. INT'L L.J. 523, 528 (2002); Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents and
Traditional Knowledge of the Uses of Plants: Is A Communal Patent Regime
Part of the Solution To the Scourge of Bio Piracy?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 163, 181 (2001).
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method" is not an invention.66 Furthermore, the "presentation of
information" is not an invention under the British Act.67
Recently, the Supreme Court, in rapid succession, granted
certiorari in three cases that raised Section 101's long-held three-
part subject matter exception to patentability, considering in turn
the patentability of abstract ideas, laws of nature, and products of
nature. In 2010, in Bilski v. Kappos, the Court held that an abstract
idea-hedging in trading energy futures-could not be patented.68
In 2012, in Mayo v. Prometheus, the Court held, 9-0, that a law of
nature-how the body responded to the administration of a drug-
was not patentable.6 9 To round out its consideration of the three-
pronged exception, the Supreme Court decided Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., holding that an
isolated human gene is a product of nature and not patentable.7 0
The Court's decision in Myriad was unanimous. The Court wrote:
We have long held that this provision contains an important implicit
exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are
not patentable. Rather, they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work that lie beyond the domain of patent protection. As
the Court has explained, without this exception, there would be
considerable danger that the grant of patents would tie up the use of
such tools and thereby inhibit future innovation premised upon them.
This would be at odds with the very point of patents, which exist to
promote creation.71
The Myriad decision rests on 150 years' worth of legal
precedents holding that mere discoveries are not patentable and
that a gene is an unpatentable product of nature.7 2 The Court noted
66 Patents Act of 1977, 37, §1(2)(a) (U.K.).
67 Id.
68 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
69 Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Lab., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
70 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
71 Id. at 2116 (2013) (citing Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Lab.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293, 1301 (2012) and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980)) (quotation marks and alteration marks omitted).
72 See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112-21, 132 (1853); American
Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 594 (1874);
Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884); American
Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1931); Funk Bros. Seed
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that "groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does
not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry."7
The Court's holding is in keeping with the understanding of the
scientific and medical communities, which classify human genes
as discoveries and products of nature, rather than inventions. The
Human Genome Organization, the international organization of
genomic scientists, wrote in 1992 that "the human genome is our
common heritage and collective property; genetic information
is ... in the public domain .... [H]uman DNA is not patentable,
but belongs to humankind."7 4 The World Medical Association
declared that "genetic information should be general property.
Therefore no patents should be given for the human genome or
parts of it."75 The 2002 winner of the Nobel Prize in Medicine or
Physiology, Dr. John Sulston, a genetics researcher, similarly
pointed out that "[t]he genome sequence is a discovery, not an
invention."76
The premise behind the subject matter limitation in patent law
is that patents on products of nature will impede innovation in
violation of the Progress Clause. But is that premise correct? An
examination of the natural phenomenon that gene patents cover-
and the potential and actual impact of gene patents on
innovation-provide evidence that patents on products of nature do
indeed impede innovation.
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
7 3 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2110.
74 Barbara Looney, Should Genes Be Patented? The Gene Patenting
Controversy: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an International
Agreement, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 231, 239 (1994) (quoting HUMAN
GENOME ORGANIZATION, ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 10 (1992)).
7 World Medical Association, Statement on Genetics and Medicine, Oct. 2009,
available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/lOpolicies/g 1/index.html.
76 JOHN SULSTON & GEORGINA FERRY, THE COMMON THREAD: A STORY OF
SCIENCE, POLITICS, ETHICS AND THE HUMAN GENOME 266 (2002).
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III. WHAT Do GENE PATENTS COVER?
The science behind the discovery of a gene sequence was
central to the Myriad court's analysis and is also foundational to an
assessment of whether patents on human genes spur or thwart
innovation. A human gene consists of hundreds of thousands of
combinations of the chemical bases, adenine (A), cytosine (C),
guanine (G), and thymine (T). A gene is represented in scientific
research, medical practice, and patent applications by a series of
letters corresponding to the chemical bases. In all, there are
approximately three billion chemical letters in a person's
genome.77 One segment of the hemoglobin gene looks like this:
CCTGAGG.7 8 Various mutations in a gene can lead to disease.
These can be likened to typos in the spelling of the gene. A single
switch of the chemical letter A to T in the hemoglobin gene causes
a serious disease, sickle cell anemia (CCTGAGG is switched to
CCTGTGG). 7 9 Sometimes, the typo is a repeat of the chemical
letters. The devastating neurological disorder Huntington's disease
is caused by a stutter in the gene, where the chemicals represented
by letters CAG are repeated numerous times.s0 In other diseases,
the problem is caused by the deletion of certain chemical letters."
Knowing the sequence of a gene is important in diagnostics
and the development of treatment. Using a diagnostic test in which
a small segment of DNA binds to its complementary strand from
7 William Gregory Feero & Alan E. Guttmacher, Genomics, Personalized
Medicine, and Pediatrics, 14 ACADEMIC PEDIATRICS 14, 14 (2013).
78 See HBB hemoglobin, beta [Homo sapiens (human)], NAT'L CTR. FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., (Mar. 29, 2014), available at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
gene/3043.
79 See Allyson Cole-Strauss et al., Correction of the Mutation Responsible for
Sickle-Cell Anemia by an RNA-DNA Oligonucleotide, 273 SCIENCE 1386, 1386
(1996); see also Evelyn Santana et al., Different Frequency of Gene Targeting
Events by the RNA-DNA Oligonucleotide Among Epithelial Cells, 111 J.
INVESTIGATIVE DERMATOLOGY 1173, 1173 (1998).
80 F. 0. Walker, Huntington's Disease, 369 LANCET 218, 222 (2007).
1 A.J.F. GRIFFITHS ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYSIS (7th ed.
2000), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK21955/; see also
Sophie Gad et al., Identification of a Large Rearrangment of the BRCAl Gene
Using Colour Bar Code on Combed DNA in an American Breast/Ovarian
Cancer Family Previously Studied By Direct Sequencing, 38 J. MED. GENETICS
388, 388-92 (2001).
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the patient's blood, a physician can compare a person's genetic
sequence to a reference sequence, such as a normal sequence or
one with a mutation, to learn whether the patient is predisposed to
a genetic disease.82
In Myriad, the challenged patents claim isolated BRCAl and
BRCA2 breast cancer genes identified in the patents by their
sequences-the long string of the chemical bases: A, C, G, and T.83
The term "isolated" was defined in the patent as "substantially
separated from other cellular components which naturally
accompany a native human sequence or protein, e.g., ribosomes,
polymerases, many other human genome sequences and proteins,"
and the term "includes recombinant or cloned DNA isolates and
chemically synthesized analogs or analogs biologically synthesized
by heterologous systems."8 4 Because the patents cover all BRCAl
and BRCA2 genes, their coverage extends to any person's BRCAl
or 2 gene once it is removed ("isolated") from his or her body.
The patents also cover any fragment of the BRCAl gene
sequence that is at least fifteen nucleotides in length." Nucleotides
consist of a single chemical base (the A, C, G, or T) and its
attached sugar/phosphate structure. The fifteen-nucleotide
fragment claim is so broad that a sequence of fifteen nucleotides
found in BRCAl appears in all the other genes in the body.86 Thus,
Myriad could exercise its patent not only with respect to testing for
breast cancer, but also for any other gene.
Every person has a breast cancer gene, including men.87 In
most cases, the gene sequence is normal and the person is not
82 See generally Elizabeth McPherson, Genetic Diagnosis and Testing in
Clinical Practice, 4 CLINICAL MED. & RES. 123 (2006).
83 U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 at [1-2] (filed May 5, 1998); U.S. Patent No.
5,837,492 at [1, 6-7] (filed Apr. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 at [1]
(filed Dec. 2, 1997).
84 U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed May 5, 1998).
8 Patent '282 at [5-6].
86 A 15 nucleotide sequence fragment from BRCA1 was found to appear
340,000 times on Chromosome 1 alone. See Thomas Kepler et al., Metastasizing
Patent Claims on BRCAl, 95 GENOMICS 312, 313 (2010).
87 Y.C. Tai et al., Breast Cancer Risk Among Male BRCAl and BRCA2
Mutation Carriers, 99 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1811 (2007).
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genetically predisposed to breast cancer. But in some cases there is
a mutation in the breast cancer gene which increases the likelihood
that a person will develop breast cancer."8 In order to find out
whether the person was predisposed to breast cancer the person's
isolated gene sequence had to be analyzed, but the gene sequence
was covered by Myriad's patents. Similarly, in order for research
to be done, the gene must be isolated and, thus, fell under Myriad's
patents.
IV. THE UNIQUE CHALLENGES GENE PATENTS POSE FOR
INNOVATION
"As we have recognized before," wrote the Supreme Court in
Myriad, "patent protection strikes a delicate balance between
creating 'incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery'
and 'imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed
spur, invention.' "89 There are reasons to expect that patents on
isolated human genes will hinder innovation. Gene patents do not
cover tangible human-made inventions, but information from
nature that has been discovered. Because many diseases are
polygenic-the result of various genes acting in combination-it
may be necessary for genetic researchers to have access to multiple
genes, yet there is less incentive than in other fields to license
patents non-exclusively. 90 In fields where a single invention
requires the licensing of many patents, such as in the car or cell
phone industries, there is an incentive for patent holders in that
field to deal fairly and create patent pools. 91 If one car company
needs another car company's patent there is an incentive to cross-
license, but for a small biotech company whose only intellectual
88 Id.
89 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2116 (2013) (brackets in original) (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012)).
90 See infra discussion at Part III.C.
91 A "patent pool" is an agreement between two or more patent owners to
license one or more of their patents to one another or third parties. UNITED
STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 4 (Jeanne Clark et al. eds.,
2000) (citations omitted).
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property is a gene patent, there is less incentive to participate in
patent pools as it would "undermine the gains from exclusivity." 92
A. Genes as Information
Patent law is premised on the idea that the public will get free
access to the information described in the patent in exchange for
time-limited exclusivity: 93 The right to make, use, or sell a claimed
invention, in exchange for publishing in the patent the description
of the invention for other inventors to build upon.94 However, the
system breaks down when a patent is granted for information
itself-such as the sequence of a gene. That patent gives the holder
a right to prevent others from using the disclosed information
entirely, not allowing others to build on it.
Thus, instead of incentivizing innovation gene patents can chill
further discovery. Innovation is stifled and the basic patent bargain
(exclusivity in exchange for information) is thwarted. As noted by
University of Michigan law professor Rebecca Eisenberg, "DNA
sequences are not simply molecules, they are also information." 95
She also notes that "patent claims to information-even useful
information-represent a fundamental departure from the
traditional patent bargain."96
Patents on genes have a broad preemptive effect because,
unlike a drug, a gene cannot be "invented around"-its natural
sequence is what is used in diagnosis or treatment and a man-made
alternative with differing chemicals for the gene is useless for
those purposes. With drugs and pharmaceuticals, however, the
disclosure of a new drug in a patent may motivate other
92 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700
(1998).
93 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-examining the Role of Patents in
Appropriating the Value ofDNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 787 (2000).
9 See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 29 (1991).
95 Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 786.
96 Id. at 794.
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researchers to find chemical analogs that may work better or in
slightly different ways. 97
Genetic researchers routinely use patented inventions in their
practices, such as automated gene sequencers or machines that
amplify DNA. 98 But patented genes are profoundly different from
these inventions. When a researcher uses a patented machine he or
she does not have to worry about patent infringement. The
authorization and royalty are already built into the cost of the item
the researcher is using. But when a researcher undertakes research
involving a gene or compares one genetic sequence to another-
even if comparison takes place only in the researcher's mind-the
researcher could be unwittingly infringing a gene patent. The
researcher cannot readily determine before potentially incurring
liability whether the comparison will infringe. Should researchers
assume that all genes and biological facts are patented? Should
they consult the USPTO database each time their research takes a
turn that involves a new gene, biological fact, or other product or
law of nature? Such a requirement puts a burden on the researcher
to stop, mid-thought, and access a patent database or call a patent
lawyer to determine if the use of a sequence or correlation
infringes a gene patent, ultimately slowing down research.
B. Genes as Interactive Entities
Human characteristics, genetic predispositions, and diseases
are generally the result of multiple genes acting in concert. Most
common diseases with a genetic component are polygenic, with
multiple genes having an influence. For example, eighty genetic
9 See Sarah Boseley, Scientists on a Mission to Bring Cheap Drugs to the
World's Poorest Countries, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/medicine/story/0,,1981152,00.html.
98 Francis S. Collins & Margaret A. Hamburg, First FDA Authorization of
Next-Generation Sequencer, 369 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2369, 2369 (2013). These
include a patent on PCR, the means of amplifying DNA, see Process for
Amplifying, Detecting, and/or-Cloning Nucleic Acid Sequences, U.S. Patent
No. 4,683,195 (filed Dec. 14, 1977), and patents on gene sequencers, see, e.g.,
Detection of Specific Sequences in Nucleic Acids, U.S. Patent No. 5,521,065
(filed June 8, 1994).
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loci are implicated in asthma,99 as many as forty-three genes in
diabetes,100  and twenty-nine in spinocerebellar ataxia.101
Alzheimer's disease, autism, bipolar depression, cancers, diabetes,
hypertension, hypertriglyceridaemia, multiple sclerosis, spina
bifida, and venous-thromboembolisml 02 are also polygenic.
Genetic research involving polygenic diseases is extremely
vulnerable to the problem of patent thickets when more than one
party controls patent rights to different genes that together
contribute to a particular disease. In order to develop and provide a
99 G. Malerba & P.F. Pignatti, A Review ofAsthma Genetics: Gene Expression
Studies and Recent Candidates, 46 J. APPLIED GENETICS 93, 95 (2005).
100 See U.S. Patents Nos. 7,635,559; 7,629,126; 7,585,630; 7,553,631;
7,521,193; 7,470,542; 7,374,930; 7,374,884; 7,339,040; 7,255,988; 7,227,006;
7,173,119; 6,930,181; 6,902,888; 6,849,728; 6,783,942; 6,746,853; 6,620,583;
6,562,574; 6,544,745; 6,534,272; 6,365,727; 6,326,141; 6,319,671; 6,291,172;
6,248,527; 6,232,078; 6,187,533; 6,140,067; 6,074,822; 6,060,593; 5,840,493;
5,800,998; 5,766,851; 5,719,022; 5,589,374; 5,541,060.
101 See Neal Berthels et al., Impact of Gene Patents on Diagnostic Testing: A
New Patent Landscaping Method Applied to Spinocerebellar Ataxia, 19 EUR. J.
OF HUM. GENETICS 1114, 1114 (2011); see also J.H. Barton, Emerging Patent
Issues in Genomic Diagnostics, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 939 (2006).
102 Kaoru Okuizumi & Shoji Tsuji, Alzheimer's Disease as a Polygenic
Disease, 18 NEUROPATHOLOGY 111, 111 (1998); Yun Ju Sung et al., Genetic
Investigation of Quantitative Traits Related to Autism: Use of Multivariate
Polygenic Models with Ascertainment Adjustment, 76 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 68
(2005); Malerba & Pignatti, supra note 99, at 95; Berthels et al., supra note 101,
at 1114; M.L. Hamshere et al., Polygenic Dissection of the Bipolar Phenotype,
198 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 284, 286 (2011); Paul D.P. Pharoah et al., Polygenic
Susceptibility to Breast Cancer and Implications for Prevention, 31 NATURE
GENETICS 33, 35 (2002); David M. Lonard et al., The SRC Family of
Coactivators: An Entree to Understanding a Subset of Polygenic Diseases?, 24
MOL. ENDOCRINOL. 279, 280 (2010); Alan Y. Deng, Genetic Basis ofPolygenic
Hypertension, 16 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS R195, R199 (2007); Robert
A. Hegele et al., A Polygenic Basis for Four Classical Fredrickson
Hyperlipoproteinemia Phenotypes that Are Characterized by Hypertriglyceridemia,
18 HUMAN MOLECULAR GENETICS 4189, 4190 (2009); Joanne H. Wang et al.,
Modeling the Cumulative Genetic Risk For Multiple Sclerosis From Genome-
Wide Association Data, 3 GENOME MEDICINE 3, 4 (2011); Alexander G. Bassuk
et al., Copy Number Variation Analysis Implicates the Cell Polarity Gene
Glypican 5 as a Human Spina Bifida Candidate Gene, 22 HuM. MOLECULAR
GENETICS 1097, 1103 (2012); Grahm F. Pineo, New Developments in the
Prevention and Treatment of Venous Thromboembolism, 21
PHARMACOTHERAPY 51S, 54S (2001).
JUNE 2014] 557
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
comprehensive and high-quality genetic test for predispositions to
a polygenic disease, a scientist must license the patent rights for
each contributing gene test.103 In some cases, this might involve
one hundred different genes or more and, thus, could potentially
involve one hundred different patent rights holders.
The genetics of hearing loss demonstrates this problem. At
least sixty-five different genes have already been implicated in
hearing loss, and two of these genes are patented and exclusively
licensed to Athena Diagnostics. 104 If Athena asserts its patent
rights, then it is positioned to block the development of diagnostic
tests or demand a high royalty from any party wishing to provide
the most comprehensive and high-quality test to date.
Alternatively, each gene contributing to the disease could be tested
individually, meaning sixty-five different genetic tests might need
to be done independently, which is inefficient and loses the
economic benefit of consolidation of services.
This patent thicket can be especially problematic with respect
to clinical care and research requiring biopsies. For the benefit of
the patient, the surgeon takes a small amount of tissue in the
biopsy.10 But when genetic diagnosis and research is fragmented
because the tissue must be sent to dozens of different companies
that have patents on genes related to the disease at issue or related
to genetic sequences that indicate whether a certain form of
chemotherapy will work or not, there simply is not enough tissue
for all the necessary companies. This problem is a patent artifact,
not a technological one. If a single lab were allowed to do all the
103 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 92, at 698.
104 Subhashinini Chandrasekharan & Melissa Fiffer, Impact of Gene Patents
and Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for Hearing Loss, 12
GENETICS IN MED. S171, S175-76 (2010); see also Sibylle Gaisser et al., The
Phantom Menace of Gene Patents, 458 NATURE 407, 407-08 (2009).
105 Biopsy, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/
003416.htm (last updated Feb. 26, 2014) (defining biopsy); see also Carmen
Criscitello et al., Biopsy Confirmation of Metastatic Sites in Breast Cancer
Patients: Clinical Impact and Future Perspectives, 16 BREAST CANCER RES.
205 (2014); Catharine Paddock, Tumor's Genetic Identity Not Revealed By
Single Biopsy, MED. NEWS TODAY (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.medicalnews
today.com/articles/242624.php.
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genetic sequencing required, only a small amount of tissue would
be needed.
Our emerging understanding of genes and their interaction with
the cellular environment indicates that the "old mechanistic view
of genes 'causing' complex diseases such as cancer is simply
wrong. Many human diseases are caused by complex dynamics
between non-hereditary proteins, DNA, RNA, the cellular
environment, and the external environment." 106 By allowing the
patenting of one biological element in that process, namely the
gene, research into this complex dynamic process is impeded.
Billions of dollars of government research have shown that the
gene is not "the C.E.O." of heredity and that genes interact with
other cellular elements. 107 Yet, because a gene patent holder can
assert rights over all uses of the gene that patent holder can deny
other researchers the rights to study how genes interact with other
biological elements.10
C. Gene Patents and Exclusivity
The potential negative impact of gene patents on innovation
will be further exacerbated if the patent is exclusively licensed.
The holder of a patent can decide to license the invention to
multiple entities or exclusively to just one entity. Alternatively, the
patent holder can decide not to let any person or entity make, use
or otherwise practice the invention. The problem of exclusivity
seems pronounced with gene patents because of a preference of
gene patent holders for exclusivity and because of the need to
obtain permission to undertake research from multiple patent
holders. Exclusive licensing occurred with genetic tests for breast
and ovarian cancer, Alzheimer's disease, spinocerebellar ataxia,
106 A. Cecile et al., Genome-Based Prediction of Common Diseases: Advances
and Prospects, 17 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS R166, R169 (2008).
107 Kevan M.A. Gartland et al., Progress Towards the "Golden Age" of
Biotechnology, 24S CURRENT OPINION IN BIOTECHNOLOGY S6, S6 (2013); Ray
Greek et al., Animal Models in an Age of Personalized Medicine,
9 PERSONALIZED MED. 47, 51 (2012).
108 Brief for Int'l. Ctr. of Tech. Assessment et al., supra note 30, at 24.
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hearing loss, hemachromatosis, and long QT syndrome. 109 In
addition, 52% of gene patent holders reported that they had only
granted exclusive licenses. 110 Another survey found that for-profit
firms favor exclusive licenses of DNA sequence inventions."'
Exclusive licensing of patents further hampers researchers'
ability to innovate because only one entity will then be allowed to
conduct research. The ability to undertake research is also
circumscribed when the researcher needs access to tools or
information covered by multiple patents. Not only might the costs
of research be increased by multiple patents, but if a single patent
within the group is exclusively licensed to another entity, the
research will be precluded altogether. In Science, Professors
Michael A. Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg demonstrated how
patents can deter innovation in biomedical research: "A
proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may be
stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of
research and product development."1 12
D. The Difficulties of Challenging Gene Patents
Gene patent cases are expensive and difficult to bring. The
potential beneficiaries of the research do not have standing to
sue.113 Nor can researchers bring a cause of action when their
research is impeded, unless they have been threatened with a cease
and desist letter or a patent infringement suit. 114 Even if it were
possible to sue when innovation was impeded, the median cost for
suits reported for 2006 with under $1 million in damages at risk
was $600,000; for those between $1 million and $25 million in
109 SEC'Y ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND Soc'Y, DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND
THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 21, 31-32 (2010)
[hereinafter SEC'Y ADVISORY COMM.].
110 Anna Schissel et al., Correspondence, Survey Confirms Fears About
Licensing of Genetic Tests, 402 NATURE 118, 118 (1999).
" Michelle R. Henry et al., A Pilot Survey on the Licensing of DNA
Inventions, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 442, 447 (2003).
112 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 92, at 698.
113 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
114 Id. at 1344.
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damages at risk, the median cost was $2.5 million; and for suits
with more than $25 million in damages at risk, the median cost
was $5 million."' The median cost only through the end of
discovery was still $1.25 million for suits between $1 million and
$25 million. 116
V. ANALYSES OF THE EFFECTS OF GENE PATENTS ON INNOVATION
There are several reasons to suspect that patents on genes will
hinder innovation. But what actually happens in the lab and in the
physician's office? The question of whether gene sequence patents
spur or impede innovation can be broken into two parts. First, do
gene patents spur initial innovation-the location and
identification of the gene sequence? Second, do gene sequence
patents spur or impede subsequent innovation-the study of the
prevalence of the related disorder, the development of diagnostic
testing, the improvement of diagnostic testing, and the
development of treatments? Some studies focus on one of these
questions, while others look at systematic questions of whether
gene patents discourage researchers from undertaking certain types
of genetic research or discourage patients from participating in
genetic research, either of which could have a devastating impact
on innovation.
One should not underestimate the difficulty of studying
whether gene patents are necessary for innovation. It is hard to
analyze what innovation would have occurred, for example, if
there were no gene patents. It is also hard to study whether a chill
created by gene patents has led researchers to go into a different
field of research entirely. Some studies exist, however, that attempt
to assess whether researchers behave differently when they plan to
patent genes than they would have if no such patents were
available.1 17 Others address the extent to which researchers stop
doing certain types of research because of gene patents.' Still
115 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N, 2007 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 22 (2007).
116 d.
1 See infra Part V.C.1.
1 See infra Part V.B.
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other studies assess the extent to which the existence of gene
patents may make people less willing to participate in research,
thwarting the innovations of gene discovery and the development
of diagnostics and treatments for genetic diseases. 19
A. Are Gene Sequence Patents Necessary for the Initial Innovation?
The scientific literature suggests that patents are not necessary
to ensure the discovery of genetic sequences. Scientists were
searching for and finding genes long before patents were available.
They try to discover genes for many reasons-to help mankind,
win Nobel Prizes, attain academic achievement, and create
professional status. 12 0 There is no evidence that the grant of gene
patents, as opposed to the patent on the gene sequencing machine,
facilitated faster gene discovery.121 A 2004 National Academy of
Sciences report noted that scientists received the benefits of
increased prestige and reputation as rewards for their discoveries.122
Most geneticists are willing to undertake research to discover
genes without patenting them. In fact, in a study of 1,229
American Society of Human Genetics members, 61% of those in
industry, 78% of those in government, and 77% of academic
scientists stated that they disapproved of patenting DNA. 12 3 Forty-
seven percent of respondents believed that patenting inhibits
biomedical research while only 27% of respondents believed that
gene patenting is necessary to encourage innovation. 124 Thus, most
119 See infra Part V.C.3.
120 See John. M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and
Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50
EMORY L.J. 101, 152-61 (2001) (detailing empirical evidence that "public sector
values," such as intellectual curiosity and professional reputation, comprise the
"dominant source of motivation for scientific and technological innovation").
121 See, e.g., SEC'Y ADVISORY COMM., supra note 109, at 20-23 (describing
the Committee's findings that "scientists are motivated to conduct genetic
research by reasons other than patents, suggesting that discoveries will be sought
regardless of the availability of intellectual property rights").
122 STEPHEN A. MERRILL, RICHARD C. LEVIN & MARK B. MYERS, A PATENT
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 26 (The National Academy Press, 2004).
123 Issac Rabino, How Human Geneticists in US View Commercialization of
the Human Genome Project, 29 NATURE GENETICS 15, 15 (2001).
124 Id.
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of the people whose professional lives are devoted to finding genes
would do so without patenting them.
In fact, during the progress of the Human Genome Project
("HGP") there was concern that gene patenting could be a
significant hindrance.125 The HGP's governing body, the National
Human Genome Research Institute, required that all human
genomic DNA sequence data resulting from projects under its
funding be placed in the public domain. 12 6 The concern was that
patent applications on primary human genomic DNA sequences
could have a "chilling effect on the development of future
inventions of useful products."127
"[D]iscoveries will be sought regardless of the availability of
intellectual property rights,"128 concluded the Secretary of Health
and Human Services' Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health,
and Society. For example, the researchers involved in the race to
find the Alzheimer's gene "were driven by wanting priority of
scientific discovery, prestige, scientific credit, and the ability to
secure funding for additional research based on scientific
achievement. "129
Moreover, the patent incentive was not necessary for
investment in gene discovery because the scientific work was
generally funded by the U.S. Congress as part of the Human
Genome Project through taxpayer money, rather than private
funding. Over $1.8 billion of taxpayer money was spent by the
U.S. government and non-profit institutions on genomics in the
year 2000 alone. 13 0 For example, Myriad used over $5,000,000 of
125 See generally Leslie Roberts, Who Owns the Human Genome, 237 SCIENCE
358 (1987).
12 6 NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., NHGRI Policy Regarding
Intellectual Property of Human Genomic Sequence (Apr. 9, 1996),
http://www.genome.gov/pfv.cfm?pagelD=10000926.
127 Id.
128 SEC'Y ADVISORY COMM., supra note 109, at 23.129 Id. at 21; Katie Skeehan et al., Impact of Patents and Licensing Practices
on Access to Genetic Testing for Alzheimer's Disease, 12 GENETICS IN MED.
S71, S77 (2010).
130 Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 2, 10 n.52 (2005).
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taxpayer money, a grant from the National Institutes of Health, to
fund the discovery of the BRCAl gene sequence.131 Myriad also
relied on the work of federal researchers from the National
Institutes of Environmental Health Sciences (also paid with
taxpayer money) and researchers from other institutions.13 2
In Myriad, amici curiae argued in favor of the patenting of
genes, asserting that patents are needed to promote genetic
innovations.133 However, none of these amici provided any actual
evidence that gene patents were necessary for the initial discovery
of gene sequences related to diseases or for subsequent innovation
for new diagnostics or treatments for those diseases. 13 4 Even the
BRCAl and BRCA2 sequences at issue in Myriad would have
been discovered without the patent incentive. The Breast Cancer
Linkage Consortium, an international network of breast cancer
researchers, was fully engaged in identifying the BRCAl gene in a
131 Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development
and Application of Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 131 (2002)
("This research was supported in part by funding from the pharmaceutical
company Eli Lilly, but also from government agencies such as the NIH which
provided Skolnick with more than $5 million specifically to look for BRCA1.").
132 Rachel Nowak, NIH in Danger of Losing Out on BRCA] Patent, 266
SCIENCE 209, 209 (1994).
133 Brief for Biotech. Indus. Org. and Ass'n of Univ. Tech. Managers as Amici
Curiae Supporting Reversal at 4, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702
F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 2010-1406) [hereinafter Amici Curiae
BIO]; see also Brief for Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Defendant-Appellant Myriad Genetics, Inc. at 17, USPTO, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 2010-1406) ("Without patent protection, the
companies with the necessary expertise to develop those tests would lack a key
incentive to undertake the research investment necessary to create and market
these products and services.").
134 "In fact, the examples cited by these Amici prove the harm that such
patents have caused. For example, [Amici Curiae BIO] argues that the patenting
of the hepatitis C genome was a success story. But it actually has been a disaster
for public health because the patent holder blocked the deployment of an
inexpensive effective test developed by a small biotechnology company and, as
a result, many patients have not been tested or received timely treatment. Letter
from Martin Munzer to Xavier Becerra, U.S. Congressman (May 25, 2007)."
Brief for Am. Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16-
17, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 U.S. 2107
(2013) (No. 12-398) (citations omitted).
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cooperative effort and planned to make the sequence publicly
available and not to patent it.135 The publicly funded Consortium
did most of the work to identify the BRCAl gene, but shortly
before it completed its work, Mark Skolnick, a member of the
Consortium, founded Myriad Genetics and sought a patent on the
BRCAl gene, in violation of the goals of the Consortium. 13 6
Skolnick utilized taxpayer money to sequence the BRCAl gene,137
yet, once the gene was patented, the public paid over $400 million
more in royalties each year because of those patents.13 8 If Skolnick
had not sought the patent, the gene sequence would have been
placed in the public domain.
A similar situation occurred with BRCA2. Myriad collaborated
with Dr. Michael Stratton of London's Institute for Cancer
Research and other researchers. 13 9 Stratton ended the collaboration
upon learning of Myriad's plans to patent the gene. 14 0 The day after
Myriad filed its patent for the BRCA2 gene, the Stratton group
published its identification of the BRCA2 gene in Nature.14 1 As the
district court in Myriad pointed out, "the consensus among the
scientific community is that the Stratton group, rather than Myriad,
was the first to sequence the BRCA2 gene." 142 Thus, patents were
not necessary for the discovery of the BRCAl and BRCA2 genes.
In fact, the patent incentive can impede the discovery of novel
sequences. When Jonathan Shestack's son was diagnosed with
135 Jordan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control over
Predictive Breast Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent
Law and Public Policy, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 133, 143-44 (2004); Phyllida
Brown & Kurt Kleiner, Patent Row Splits Breast Cancer Researchers, NEW
SCIENTIST, Sept. 24, 1994, at 44.
136 Paradise, supra note 135, at 143.
137 Williams-Jones, supra note 131, at 131; Nowak, supra note 132, at 209.
138 In 2012, Myriad spent $51,500,000 to perform molecular diagnostic tests
and gained revenue for their tests totaling $472,390,000. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 14, 2013).
139 Williams-Jones, supra note 131, at 132.
140 Id.
141 Richard Wooster et al., Identification of the Breast Cancer Susceptibility
Gene BRCA2, 378 NATURE 789 (1995).
142 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 202
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Robert Dalp6 et al., Watching the Race to Find the
Breast Cancer Genes, 28 SCI. TECH. AND HUM. VALUES 187, 198-99 (2003).
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autism in 1992, experts estimated that researchers would need
DNA samples from at least 100 families with two or more autistic
members in order to pinpoint a gene associated with autism.143
Shestack contacted the four groups of university scientists who
were searching for autism genes and offered them funding.144 He
discovered that no group had enough DNA samples to determine
which genes are autism-related, but there were more than enough if
the groups pooled their samples. 145 Shestack asked the four groups
to share their DNA samples with each other so that they all had a
better shot at identifying autism-related genes. 14 6 Every researcher
with whom he spoke refused to share samples. 147 Each wanted to
be the one to find the autism gene and patent it.148 Rather than
speed up the discovery of a gene sequence, the possibility of
obtaining a patent slowed it down. 149
The possibility of patenting genes led colleagues and
institutions to pressure scientists to seek such patents. As an article
in Science pointed out, "Researchers and their institutions may
resent restrictions on access to the patented discoveries of others,
yet nobody wants to be the last one left dedicating findings to the
public domain."150
The perceived need for gene patents fails to account for the
incentives that already exist for innovation. In many other






149 Id. Frustrated, Shestack started the Autism Genetic Resource Exchange to
collect DNA samples from autistic patients and their families. Within a year, the
Autistic Genetic Resource Exchange had DNA samples from 100 families. Id.
Since then, its collection has grown to include samples from more than 2,000
families, which it makes available to autism researchers worldwide. AUTISM
GENETIC RES. EXCH., AGRE for Families, http://agre.autismspeaks.org/site/
c.IwLZKnN1LtH/b.5002167/k.93B4/AGRE for Families.htm (last visited Apr.
17, 2014). Over 400 research groups have used the AGRE database since 2001,
publishing over 200 peer-reviewed scientific articles. AUTISM SPEAKS, Sharing
our Genes for Research (June 25, 2013), http://www.autismspeaks.org/science/
science-news/sharing-our-genes-research.
150 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 92, at 698-99.
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economic sectors, such as open-source software, fashion, and
cooking, vigorous innovation exists wholly without patent rights."1 '
In fact, because of the potential for rapid and unrestricted copying,
those sectors may develop innovations more quickly than in
sectors protected by patent rights. Moreover, incentives to innovate
already exist in the biotechnology and medical industries because
the innovators are themselves users of the innovations.152 No one
would seriously argue at this time that doctors need to patent
surgical and diagnostic methods because without patents there is
insufficient investment, invention, or discovery. And unlike in the
pharmaceutical industry where massive costs of clinical trials
require exclusive rights to protect investments, genetic discoveries
and their application to testing, which largely do not entail such
costs, may be more readily protected through traditional means
such as lead-time advantage and complementary products and
services.15
B. Are Gene Sequence Patents Necessary for Subsequent Innovation?
Patenting DNA sequences can impede biomedical research by
slowing progress at both the individual laboratory level and at a
system-wide level, as well as by increasing the financial costs of
undertaking research. 15 4 These impediments occur in at least four
ways: (1) discouraging scientific researchers' undertaking of
15 See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh
(Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REv. 1787 (2008); Kal
Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REv. 1687 (2006); Lights,
Camera, Africa, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.economist.com/
node/17723124; Johanna Blakeley, Lessons from Fashion's Free Culture,
TEDxUSC 2010, YOUTUBE (Apr. 13, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=zL2FOrx4lNO.
152 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandberg, Users as Innovators: Implications for
Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 467, 483-90 (2008) (discussing
conditions under which user innovations will be disseminated and patent rights
will be counterproductive).
15 See generally Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
154 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 92, at 698.
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genetic research; (2) discouraging scientific researchers' public
disclosure of data; (3) discouraging scientific researchers'
cooperation with each other; and (4) discouraging volunteer
participation in clinical studies.
1. Effects of Gene Patents on Researchers' Undertaking of Genetic
Research
Scientists are frequently inhibited from initiating or continuing
genetic research because of the existence of gene patents.' A
scientific researcher who wants to conduct gene-related research
might be required to pay a costly license fee for patent rights or
else risk liability for patent infringement. In fact, the researcher
might be required to obtain multiple licenses, each with its own
15 See SEC'Y ADVISORY COMM., supra note 109, at 33; Declaration of Harry
Ostrer at 10, 12-14, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp.
2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009) (No. 09-4515); Declaration of Madhuri
Hegde, USPTO, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2009) (No. 09-4515); Declaration of
Mildred Cho at 2, 9-16, 24, USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17,
2009) (No. 09-4515); Declaration of Haig H. Kazazian at 7-11, USPTO, 702
F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) (No. 09-4515); Declaration of Arupa
Ganguly at 3-14, USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2009)
(No. 09-4515); Declaration of Elizabeth Swisher at 14-21, USPTO, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2009) (No. 09-4515); Declaration of David
Ledbetter at 13-27, USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2009)
(No. 09-4515); Declaration of Debra Leonard at 19, USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009) (No. 09-4515); Supplemental Declaration of
Ellen Matloff at 6-8, USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010)
(No. 09-4515); Misha Angrist et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing
Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for Long QT Syndrome, 12 GENETICS
MEDICINE S111, S118 (2010); Berthels et al., supra note 101, at 1114;
Chandrasekharan & Fiffer, supra note 104; Mildred Cho et al., Effects ofPatents
and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J.
MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5, 7 (2003); Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing
Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577 (2002); Ashton Powell et al.,
Spinocerebellar Ataxia: Patient and Health Professional Perspectives on
Whether and How Patents Affect Access to Clinical Genetic Testing, 12
GENETICS MEDICINE S83, S90, S91 (2010); Kimberly Blanton, Corporate Take-
Over Exploiting the US Patent System, A Single Company Has Gained Control
over Genetic Research and Testing for Breast Cancer, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 24,
2002, at 10; see also Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic
Genetics, 287 JAMA 473, 478 (2002); Rabino, supra note 123, at 15 (2001);
Schissel et al., supra note 110, at 118.
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costly fee, if more than one patent covers the same gene.
Furthermore, patent owners can withhold consent to licensing
patent rights altogether for the life of the patent or grant exclusive
rights to only one party and then threaten legal action against all
other researchers, thereby inhibiting research conducted by
universities, research institutions, and private groups. 15 6
Forty percent of scientific researchers reported difficulties with
being allowed to use a patented invention.15 7 A substantial number
of geneticists report that gene patents detrimentally impact
subsequent discoveries: 49% of American Society of Human
Genetics members reported being forced to limit their research in
some way due to the existence of various gene patents.' Often,
geneticists have been foreclosed from undertaking research on a
substantial number of genes. Dr. Debra Leonard's research at the
University of Pennsylvania encountered roadblocks due to gene
patents. She received numerous cease and desist letters demanding
she stop research or pay licensing fees for the use of DNA
molecules relating to the genes underlying Alzheimer's disease,
cystic fibrosis, hemochromatosis, Canavan disease, and
spinocerebellar ataxia. 15 9
Studies show the negative effects of patents on gene research
into breast cancer, 160 ovarian cancer, 161 Charcot-Marie-Tooth
156 Stifling or Stimulating-The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic
Testing Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Dr. Wendy Chung, director of Clinical Genetics at Columbia
University).
157 STEPHEN HANSEN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF PATENTING IN THE AAAS
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 21 (2006).
15 Rabino, supra note 123, at 15.
159 Blanton, supra note 155, at 10.
160 Subhashini Chandrasekharan & Melissa Fiffer, Impact of Gene Patents and
Licensing Practices On Access to Genetic Testing For Hearing Loss, 12
GENETICS IN MED. S171, S184 (2010); Robert Cook-Deegan et al., Impact of
Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for
Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast and Ovarian Cancers
with Colon Cancers, 12 GENETICS IN MED. S15, S16 (2010); Tom Walsh et al.,
Spectrum of Mutations in BRCAl, BRCA2, CHEK2, and TP53 in Families at
High Risk ofBreast Cancer, 295 JAMA 1379, 1379 (2006).
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disease,162 Alzheimer's disease,163 Duchenne muscular dystrophy
disease, 16 4 MODY, 165  hereditary hemochromatosis, 166  Canavan
disease,167 spinocerebellar ataxia,168 long QT syndrome, 16 9 and
hearing loss. 17 0 The assertion of patent rights by gene patent
holders have resulted in the reduction of genetic tests performed by
laboratories for numerous diseases, such as Alzheimer's disease,171
breast cancer,172 Cananvan disease,173 hemochromatosis, 17 4 long QT
syndrome,175 ovarian cancer,17 6 and spinocerebellar ataxia.177 In
other situations, the patent holder's offer for a license was
determined to be cost-prohibitive, often because the total volume
161 Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 160, at S16.
162 Debra G.B. Leonard, Improved Method for Diagnosis of Charcot-Marie-
Tooth Type lA: Patent Pending?, 47 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 807, 807 (2001).
163 Skeehan et al., supra note 129, at S76 (discussing concerns about impact of
gene patents on multiplex testing).
164 Amy Dockser Marcus, Licenses Drive Gene Debate, WALL ST. J., April 15,
2010.
165 Brandon L. Pierce et al., The Impact of Patents on the Development of
Genome-Based Clinical Diagnostics: An Analysis of Case Studies, 11 GENETICS
IN MED. 202 (2009).
166 Subhashini Chandrasekharan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing
On Access to Genetic Testing For Hereditary Hemachromatosis, 12 GENETICS
INMED. S155, S157 (2010).
167 Alessandra Colaianni et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing
Practices On Access to Genetic Testing and Carrier Screening for Tay-Sachs
and Canavan Disease, 12 GENETICS IN MED. S5, S12 (2010); see also
Subhashini Chandrasekharan, Christopher Heaney et al., Impact of Gene Patents
and Licensing Practices On Access to Genetic Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, 12
GENETICS IN MED. S194, S194 (2010).
168 Berthels et al., supra note 101, at 1114.
169 Angrist et al., supra note 155, at S118.
170 Chandrasekharan & Fiffer, supra note 160, at S184.
171 Skeehan et al., supra note 129.
172 Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 160, at S28; Walsh et al., supra note 160, at
1379.
173 Colaianni et al., supra note 167, at S12.
174 Chandrasekharan et al., supra note 166, at S157; see Merz et al., supra note
155, at 579.
175 Angrist et al., supra note 155, at S118.
176 Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 160, at S28.
177 Powell et al., supra note 155, at S83; Berthels et al., supra note 101, at
1114.
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of genetic tests performed at university laboratories is not large
enough to justify the cost.178
The impediments to research caused by patents might be even
greater in genetics than in any other area of science because
isolated DNA molecules are essential to the study of living
systems. There are many types of research involving gene patents,
such as basic science research into gene function or the
contribution of gene sequences to diseases and more downstream
research into implementing new genetic tests to diagnose diseases
or improve the accuracy of diagnostic testing. 179
Myriad has blocked scientific research of the BRCAl and
BRCA2 genesso at university laboratories, such as at Columbia
University,"11 Emory University,182 the University of Chicago,183 the
University of Pennsylvania, 18 4 and Yale University.' In its
defense, Myriad asserted that over 8000 papers can be found in the
scientific literature on PubMed that make reference to BRCAl and
BRCA2. Myriad argued that the existence of these papers proves
its patents do not prevent scientific research.1 86 However, this
number is misleading because the search results include thousands
of articles that do not involve any potentially infringing conduct:
(1) review articles, which do not report new findings; (2) articles
reporting research conducted in other countries; (3) studies that do
not involve human genes but rather gene homologs from other
178 See Colaianni et al., supra note 167, at S12; Chandrasekharan et al., supra
note 166, at S157; Merz et al., supra note 155, at 577.
179 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 92, at 698.
180 Blanton, supra note 155, at 10.
18 Declaration of Wendy Chung at 15-22, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology
v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009) (No. 09-4515).
182 Declaration of David Ledbetter, supra note 155, at 15-27.
183 Id. at 14.
184 Declaration of Arupa Ganguly, supra note 155, at 3-14; Declaration of
Haig H. Kazazian at 7-11, USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17,
2009) (No. 09-4515).
18 Supplemental Declaration of Ellen Matloff, supra note 155, at 6-8.
186 Myriad Genetics, Brief in Opposition at 16, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (Oct. 31, 2012) (No. 12-398);
Declaration of Philip R. Reilly at 43, USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 23, 2009) (No. 09-4515); Declaration of Gregory Critchfield at 13,
USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009) (No. 09-4515).
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species; and (4) studies that do not involve the isolation of DNA.187
For example, the first page of results of a PubMed search for
BRCAl or BRCA2 includes numerous articles that do not involve
isolating or analyzing either gene. Myriad's count of articles
include those that have nothing to do with patents, such as those
with any mention of breast cancer, articles that address women's
sex life after mastectomy and reproductive decision-making by
carriers of a mutation.' The mere fact that scientific papers have
been published about breast cancer in general does not prove that
innovation based on research on the genetic sequence has not been
thwarted.
Empirical research demonstrates that patents claiming human
nucleotide sequences have a negative impact on follow-up research
187 Further restricting the search to articles in English and on Human BRCA1
shortens the total number of results to 2,896. However, this result still includes
articles from authors performing research on BRCA1 in other countries,
including China and France.
188 See Louise Donnelly et al., Reproductive Decision-Making in Young
Female Carriers of a BRCA Mutation, INT'L J. CANCER (2013) (discussing the
effect of personal experience with cancer on reproductive decision-making in
young women); Lesley King et al., Intentions for Bilateral Mastectomy Among
Newly Diagnosed Breast Cancer Patients, J. SURGERY ONCOLOGY (2012)
(investigating the factors behind a rise in bilateral mastectomies among women
diagnosed with unilateral breast cancer); see, e.g., Ellen Matloff et al.,
Unraveling the Next Chapter: Sexual Development, Body Image and Sexual
Functioning in Female BRCA Carriers, 15 CANCER J. 15 (2009) (discussing the
unique set of emotional, physical, and sexual issues for female BRCA carriers);
Supplemental Declaration of Ellen Matloff, supra note 155, at 6-7. Former
Myriad adviser Phillip Reilly argues that "[t]he sheer volume of scientific
publications on BRCA1/2 genes and their gene products belies the purported
impediment in basic research. On December 10, 2009, I performed a search
using the term 'BRCAl' in the PubMed database which retrieved almost 7,000
references. A similar PubMed search conducted using the term 'BRCA2'
retrieved over 4,000 references." Declaration of Philip R. Reilly, supra note 186,
at 43. Reilly's statement is ultimately unpersuasive. Although researchers may
continue to research patented genes without licenses, thus infringing the patent
unknowingly or with indifference to liability, the gene patent owner and any
exclusive licensee has the power to enforce their patents. Moreover, Reilly's
search did not compare the number of publications before and after the patent on
BRCA1 was granted. Instead, he looked at the total number of publications-
which does not support his conclusion.
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and the production of public genetic knowledge. 18 9 One study
compared gene patent paper citations prior to the issuance of a
patent with citations in the post-patent issuance period as a means
to evaluate the impact of gene patents on the flow of scientific
knowledge. The study showed there was between a 5% and 17%
reduction in the rate of citations after the issuance of a patent.190
The authors concluded that "[a] strict interpretation of [the] results
suggests that follow-on genetic researchers forego about one in ten
research projects . . . because of the causal impact of the gene
patent grant." 191 Moreover, the effects were greatest with patents
assigned to the private sector, with a 6% to 9% decrease in
follow-on research citations. 192 The authors interpret the decline in
citations "as a net loss to long-run public knowledge production." 193
2. Effects of Gene Patents on Epidemiological Research
Epidemiological research is important in public health to assist
in the planning of nation-wide and community-wide initiatives on
disease awareness and screening. The incidence of inherited
diseases can help guide policy decisions by governments,
physicians' groups, and healthcare insurers about the cost-
effectiveness of interventions such as preventive screening and the
priorities between different genetic tests, physical examinations,
and non-genetic lab tests.
If genes are patented, patent holders can block the collection of
epidemiological data with regard to their patented DNA
sequences. 194 This would prevent the medical community and
public at large from learning the actual incidence of genetic
189 See Declaration of Fiona E. Murray at 5, USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing her publication Does Patent Strategy Shape the
Long-Run Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human Genetics, 52
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1193 (2009)).
190 See Kenneth Huang & Fiona Murray, Does Patent Strategy Shape the
Long-Run Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human Genetics, 52




194 See Timothy Caulfield et al., Patenting Human Genetic Material:
Refocusing the Debate, 1 NATURE REvS. 227, 230 (2000).
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sequence variations in the population and those sequences'
relationship to particular diseases. This patent power might be used
to prevent refinement in the estimates of the prevalence of genetic
sequences in the population.
Simultaneously, the patent holder can distribute its own genetic
incidence data and, in bad faith, report higher incidences than
really exist or at least maintain outdated data for the life of the
patent. This patent power might prevent the discovery of new data
that could reveal mistakes in the data existing at the time of
patenting and disclosed in the patent. There are already examples
of patent owners refusing to share results from their own
proprietary genetic tests with public medical databases. 195
Asserting a patent over genes can freeze epidemiological evidence
in time from the date of the patent until the patent expires 20 years
later.
When a patent application is filed, the patent examiner has to
take what the applicant says as correct, and there is no FDA review
when a company offers a genetic test as a service. 196 If a patent
holder states that one in three people in the population have the
gene related to its patent, patent rights allow the holder to prevent
others from duplicating the patent holder's research and evaluating
it to see if the patent holder has exaggerated the prevalence of the
mutation in order to sell more tests. 197
195 See Declaration of Elizabeth Swisher, supra note 155, at ( 19 (noting that
Myriad Genetics did not share data resulting from BRCA1/2 genetic testing with
the public database Breast Cancer Information Core ("BIC")).
196 See generally LORI ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS
ABOUT GENETICS, 113, 169 (Columbia University Press: New York 2001)
(discussing the FDA's power to regulate genetic testing kits marketed for
interstate commerce; however, academic, hospital, government, and commercial
organizations create "home brews" that are made of their own genetic research).
In a survey from 1995, out of forty-three biotech companies and 215 not-for-
profit organizations that marketed their own testing kits, only around fifteen
percent contacted the FDA. Id. Additionally, the FDA concedes that even
though it does have the authority to regulate "home brew" kits, it is still not
pursuing them in any manner. Id.
197 Id. at 125 (stating that when the genetic tests for breast cancer were first
offered, one out of the four institutions studied greatly exaggerated the
occurrence of the disease).
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Even if the patent holder allows research by other scientists,
the licensing costs may prevent other researchers from doing the
necessary epidemiological studies to determine, for example, what
proportion of people with the mutation in the general population
will actually manifest the disease. The researchers discovering and
patenting genes have a financial incentive to promote the use of
those genes for diagnostics as rapidly as possible, and often before
sufficient data is available to assess how well the tests predict
future disease.
In one survey, 14 out of 27 gene patent holders said they would
require a license for researchers to study the prevalence of
mutations of the patented gene in the population. 198 Myriad's gene
patents enabled it to specifically block epidemiological research at
Columbia Universityl99 and Yale University.2 00 A researcher at
Yale could not do research to determine the percentage of patients
with breast cancer who carry BRCAl mutations without infringing
Myriad's BRCAl patent.2 01 In addition, Myriad's commercial
position incentivizes its withholding of clinically useful data
regarding BRCAl and BRCA2 epidemiology.2 02 Other companies
such as Athena have also blocked epidemiological research
involving its patented genes.2 03
In a survey of owners of patents claiming DNA, over 50% said
they would insist on patent rights license agreements with any
researchers desiring to study the prevalence of sequence mutations
of the patented gene in human populations.2 04 This could halt
epidemiological research, which is necessary to reveal the
incidence of disease in the population, and seriously hamper public
health efforts.
198 Caulfield et al., supra note 194, at 230.
199 Declaration of Wendy Chung, supra note 181, at 15-22.
200 Supplemental Declaration of Ellen Matloff, supra note 155, at 6-8.
201 Id.
202 See Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing:
Clinical Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EURO. J. HUM. GENETICS 585, 586 (2012).
203 See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 160, at S28; Tom Walsh et al., supra
note 160, at 1379; Powell et al., supra note 155, at S83; Berthels et al., supra
note 101, at 1114.
204 Schissel et al., supra note 110.
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By not even allowing research to verify that what the patent
holder claims is true about the properties of the gene patented,
gene patents interfere with the scientific method itself by
preventing the replication of the gene patent holder's hypothesis.205
Gene patents can prevent study replication to confirm study data,
thereby blocking a core feature of the scientific community's error
checking mechanism.
3. Effects of Gene Patents on Research on Diagnostics
Studies have shown that gene patents are not necessary to
encourage the development of diagnostic testing after the gene
sequence is identified. Instead, gene patents have erected barriers
to researchers who use genetics to develop innovative diagnostic
tests. A comprehensive analysis by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services' Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and
Society found that "patents were not needed to develop genetic
tests for hearing loss, SCA [spinocerebellar ataxia], breast cancer,
LQTS [long QT syndrome], Canavan disease, and HH [hereditary
hemochromatosis]. Indeed, all of these tests were on the market
before the test offered by the relevant patent-rights holder."2 06
The Secretary's Advisory Committee found that patents "do
not serve as powerful incentives for either genetics research in the
diagnostic arena or the development of genetic tests" and that
researchers "likely would continue" to pursue gene-disease
association research without potential patent protection.2 07 In the
case of the breast cancer gene, various researchers were willing to
identify gene sequences and correlations without patenting them,
and there was no shortage of researchers who were trying to
sequence the breast cancer genes without the desire to patent those
sequences.2 08
205 See Alfred S. Goldhaber & Michael M. Nieto, Photon and Graviton Mass
Limits, 82 REV. MOD. PHYS. (AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY) 939, 940 (2010).
206 SEC'Y ADVISORY COMM., supra note 109, at 31.
207 SEC'Y ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, DRAFT
REPORT ON GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON
PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS, 99, 110, March 9, 2009, available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/SACGHSPatentsConsultation Draft 3 9
2009.pdf
208 Id.
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Not only were gene patents not necessary for the development
of genetic tests, according to studies, but they actually impeded the
development, deployment, and improvement of genetic tests. A
study that surveyed genetics lab directors revealed that at least
25% of labs had abandoned one or more genetic tests that they
themselves had developed, due to notification from the patent
holder or licensee.2 09 In addition, 53% of genetics labs had stopped
developing new clinical genetic tests due to concerns about gene
patents and licensing patent rights.2 10 These included diagnostic
genetic tests for Apolipoprotein E, BRCAl and BRCA2,
Duchenne/Becker muscular dystrophy, myotonic dystrophy,
Canavan disease, spinocerebellar ataxia, adenomatous polypous of
the colon, Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease, fragile X syndrome,
Huntington disease, and Factor V Leiden.211 This observation
suggests that gene patents are restricting the development of new
and improved diagnostic tools.212 These inhibitory effects occur in
direct response to gene patenting. For example, 30% of clinical
labs report not developing or abandoning testing for mutations in a
gene causing hereditary hemochromatosis in response to the
issuance of a patent to DNA sequences related to that gene.2 13
Gene patents also impede the improvement of genetic tests.
When a single entity controls all testing of a gene sequence, it
might not provide the highest quality test or it may decide, for
commercial reasons, not to offer testing for all the known
mutations in the gene sequence. Yet the gene patent impedes
others from undertaking research to develop a better test. For
example, there have been problems with quality and interpretation
of results in long QT syndrome testing where research in
diagnostics might have been useful.2 14 When more information
about genetic sequences linked to long QT syndrome was
209 Mildred K. Cho et al., Effect of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of
Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5 (2003).
2 10 Id.
211 Id.
212 See Angrist, supra note 155 ("[F]or the patents of concern here? [T]he
costs to innovation, competition, and medical care are truly serious.").
213 Merz et al., supra note 155, at 577.
214 Angrist et al., supra note 155, at Si 18 (2010).
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discovered, the lab with the exclusive license for testing for long
QT syndrome did not offer the tests for these new markers.2 15
According to a study published in 2006, the test Myriad
employed to detect breast cancer risk missed mutations that caused
the disease. 216 In the study, researchers sampled DNA from 300
members of high-risk families in which four or more members had
been diagnosed with either breast or ovarian cancer. 217 All 300
patients had received negative test results from Myriad. 218 The
research team used six methods to search DNA for breast cancer
gene mutations. 219 The researchers found that 12% of the patients
studied carried rearrangements of BRCAl or BRCA2 that were not
included in Myriad's array. 220
In France, Dr. Stoppa-Lyonnet and her colleagues found a
significant mutation in an American family's BRCAl gene that
was correlated with breast and ovarian cancer but missed by the
Myriad test.22 1 The family was missing one-third of the gene, but
the Myriad test did not look for deletions. 2 22 Yet, by undertaking
that test, the French doctors were risking a patent infringement suit
based on Myriad's European patent. 223
When numerous laboratories can study DNA sequences (rather
than just one lab, as in the case of Myriad), previously unknown
mutations will be discovered. Consequently, in countries where the
Alzheimer's and hemochromatosis genes were not patented,
2 15 Id.
216 Tom Walsh et al., supra note 160, at 1379.
2 1 71 d. at 1379.
2 1 8 Id. at 1380.
2 19 Jd. at 1380-81.
22 0 Id. at 1386.
221 See Sophie Gad et al., Identification of a Large Rearrangement of the
BRCA] Gene Using Colour Bar Code on Combed DNA in an American
Breast/Ovarian Cancer Family Previously Studied By Direct Sequencing, 38 J.
MED. GENETICS 388 (2001).
22 2 Id. at 390.
223 Id.; see also Steve Benowitz, French Challenge to BRCA] Patent
Underlies European Discontent, 94 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 80, 80-81 (2002).
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researchers found previously unknown mutations and were able to
offer patients better tests than are available in the United States.2 2 4
Even when patent owners are willing to license patent rights
non-exclusively to multiple laboratories, the cost, complexity, and
time delays have served as major impediments to researchers. A
study that surveyed American scientists of various disciplines
reported how patents directly affected their research decisions:
58% had delayed research, 50% had changed research, and 28%
had abandoned research.225 The study reported that 58% of
scientists believed that complex licensing negotiations for patent
rights was the main factor preventing their participation in certain
areas of research.226 For example, GeneDX is a company focused
on developing tests for rare genetic disorders, but the president of
GeneDX has stated that expenses resulting from gene patents, like
negotiating licenses, paying upfront, and ongoing royalty costs,
have caused GeneDX to lose interest in developing a test for rare
disorders covered by gene patents.227 In another example, a global
public health crisis emerged with the quick spread of a pathogenic
coronavirus that caused severe acute respiratory syndrome
("SARS"). SARS vaccine research was likely inhibited and
delayed because of concerns about the patent rights regarding the
DNA sequences in the SARS-causing virus.228
224 Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee of
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 121-127 (2000) (statement of Dr. Jon F. Merz).
225 HANSEN ET AL., supra note 157, at 7.
226 Id.
227 SEC'Y ADVISORY COMM., supra note 109, at 29-30.
228 James H.M. Simon et al., Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) Intellectual Property Rights: The Possible Role Of Patent Pooling, 83
BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 707, 708 (2005). "These firms face the
unenviable task of deciding whether to invest potentially many years' [sic] of
effort and hundreds of millions of dollars into developing a vaccine without
knowing whether there will be a market for it," researchers wrote in the World
Health Organization Bulletin. "The uncertainty over patent rights makes this
decision even more difficult, because it is neither possible to determine the
future cost of licensing the patent rights, nor whether all necessary patents will
be available for licensing ..... Id.
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Gene patent holders might have little incentive to undertake
research to create their own gene-based products. Instead, by not
initially asserting their patent rights, they may allow others to
develop genetic tests, vaccines, or medical therapies. When a
commercial application is finally developed, the patent owner may
step in and sue the true innovator to collect royalties for past
infringement, block the improved technology from reaching the
public for the life of the patent, or just take the other party's
innovative technology away from them and sell it for their own
profit. These potential scenarios can ultimately deter researchers
who are aware of patents from trying to develop better tests and
treatments.
The potential for gene patent holders to assert claims to other
scientists' later work discourages innovation. According to SARS
researchers, "The net result is a scenario in which patent owners,
putative licensees and consumers may lose out by incurring
increased costs, risks and potential delays to product development,
which in turn will have an impact on public health."22 9 Yet, time is
of the essence in mitigating public health crises, such as reducing
the spread of infectious diseases by developing and deploying
effective vaccines.
Gene patents also hamper pharmacogenomics research, the
development of genetic tests to determine if a particular drug will
be effective for a particular patient. Such tests look for a particular
genetic variation (such as a T rather than an A at a certain point in
the genome). But if the patent holder is also the maker of the drug,
the patent holder might prohibit anyone from using that test. For
example, a pharmaceutical company has filed for a patent on a
genetic test to determine the effectiveness of its asthma drug.2 30 But
the company says it will not develop the test-or let anyone else
develop it.231 A test would help doctors determine that certain
people would not benefit from the inhaler, thus diminishing the
market for the inhaler.
2291d.
230 Geeta Anand, Big Drug Makers Try to Postpone Custom Regimens, WALL
ST. J. B1, B1 (2001).
231 Id.
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In Myriad, the company relied on a 2002 survey of twenty-five
German pharmaceutical companies, biotech startups, and clinical
institutions to argue that gene patents have not slowed research.232
The authors of the survey concluded that there was no reluctance
of those interviewed to enter research fields where "gene related
patents" had been granted and that patents on research tools,
including isolated DNA molecules, had no effect on the cost or
pace of research in Germany.233 But the findings of the German
study are not applicable to research and gene patent practices in the
United States. In contrast to the law in the United States, German
patent law contains a general research exemption which states that
the "effect of a patent shall not extend to acts done for
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented
invention."2 3 4 The United States, however, has only an extremely
limited research exemption.2 35 The German Patent Act allows for
the application and grant of a compulsory license for reasons of
public interest.236 U.S. patent law does not have such a compulsory
licensing provision.
In summary, patents on genes have slowed the development
and improvement of genetic tests, have prevented the integration of
new knowledge into tests currently being offered, and have
deterred the development of tests for some diseases altogether.
232 Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 45-
46, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y,
Dec. 23, 2009) (No. 09-4515) (citing Declaration of Joseph Straus at 40-
43, USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09-4515)). Straus' declaration describes
the study published as Joseph Straus et al., Genetic Inventions and Patent Law:
An Empirical Survey of Selected German R & D Institutions, MAX PLANCK
INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION AND TAX LAW (2004).
233 Joseph Straus et al., supra note 232.
234 German Patent Act (PatG) § 11.2 (1998).
235 See Paradise & Janson, supra note 42, at 150. (35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1)
exempts "uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs or veterinary biological products.").
236 PatG § 11.24 (1998). Section 11.24 of the German Patent Act allows the
grant of a compulsory license, if such a license would be in public interest.
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C. What Are The Effects of Gene Patents on Researchers' and
Research Subjects' Willingness to Participate in Research?
Gene patents can hinder innovation in a less direct manner as
well. They can discourage researchers and research subjects from
participating in research where genes are likely to be patented.
1. Effects of Gene Patents on Researchers' Withholding or
Delaying Public Disclosure ofData
Traditionally, scientists conducting publicly-funded research
tended to favor disseminating discoveries and data to each other
and to the public at large.2 37 Recently, however, there appears to be
a trend toward less disclosure of information from university
researchers, especially in biomedical research.2 38 In particular,
there is evidence that gene patents might be causing delays in
publishing or the withholding of key discoveries and data from the
public, who might have funded the research in the first place.2 39
Before the 1980s, university researchers using federal funds
were prohibited from patenting their work. But with the passage of
the Bayh-Dole Act, the universities and researchers could seek
237 See, e.g., Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its
Normative Implications, 75 CHI. KENT L. REV. 15 (1999).
238 Id.; see also David Blumenthal et al., Data Withholding in Genetics and
the Other Life Sciences: Prevalences and Predictors, 81 ACAD. MED. 137
(2006) [hereinafter Prevalences and Predictors]; David Blumenthal et al.,
Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Sciences: Evidence from a
National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224 (1997) [hereinafter National
Survey of Faculty]; Campbell et al., supra note 155, at 473; Christine Vogeli et
al., Data Withholding and the Next Generation of Scientists: Results of a
National Survey, 81 ACAD. MED. 128 (2006); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do
Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific
Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005); JOHN WALSH ET AL.,
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' COMMITTEE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEIN-RELATED
INVENTIONS 10 (Patents, Material Transfers, and Access to Research Inputs in
Biomedical Research 2005).
239 Prevalences and Predictors, supra note 238, at 142; National Survey of
Faculty, supra note 238, at 1224; Campbell et al., supra note 155, at 473-80;
Huang & Murray, supra note 190, at 1214; Vogeli et al., supra note 238, at 128-
36; Murray & Stem, supra note 238, at 683; WALSH ET AL., supra note 238, at
10.
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patents.2 4 0 The commercial possibilities provided by patenting
DNA are causing (1) less sharing of information between scientists
and (2) less cooperation among scientific groups.2 4 1 The reduction
in sharing information has a direct impact on collaborative efforts
among researchers, impeding innovation. According to a study of
academic researchers in the life sciences, one in five professors
had delayed publication of research results for at least half a year
in order to protect financial interests such as patent rights.2 42 The
study found that scientists who directly engaged in the
commercialization of their research were three times more likely to
delay publication than those doing basic work.2 43
The trend of secrecy and delay in publishing data while seeking
a patent has a particularly negative impact on genetic research.
Among life science researchers, geneticists were the most likely to
report withholding data.2 " A study that surveyed mostly geneticists
reported that 24% felt there were frequent delays in publication
caused by the withholding of data.2 45
A survey of life scientists at the 100 most research-intensive
universities in the United States reported that 44% of geneticists
and 32% of other life scientists had withheld data, either in verbal
exchanges or as part of the publishing process.2 46 While the most
common reason for withholding information was to "protect their
lead," about 6% of scientists reported withholding information to
allow time for patents.2 47 For example, the discovery of a gene
causing hemochromatosis was submitted for publication over a
240 Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3018 (1980) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2012)).
241 Surveys of academic researchers suggest there is a trend toward less and
less sharing of information. See infra Part V.C.1.
242 National Survey ofFaculty, supra note 235, at 1226.
243 Id. at 1227.
244 Id.
245 Campbell et al., supra note 155, at 478.
246 Prevalences and Predictors, supra note 238, at 140-42 (2006). The
incidence of data-withholding might be higher than reported in the study
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year after the gene patent was filed, most likely for the purpose of
assuring patent rights were secured first.2 48
There is evidence suggesting that the increase in secrecy in the
university laboratories is also damaging the training of new
scientists. A survey of doctoral students and postdoctoral fellows
in the life sciences revealed profound effects of data withholding
on the next generation of scientists. Of the trainees surveyed, 49%
said withholding of information had a negative effect on progress
in their laboratory and 33% felt it interfered with their education.2 4 9
Approximately 25% of trainees reported that they had asked and
been denied access to information, data, materials, or programming
associated with published or unpublished research during their
training. 25 0 Nearly 33% of postdoctoral fellows reported exposure
to withholding of both published and unpublished information,
data or materials, while only about 20% of doctoral students
reported similar withholding experiences. 25 1 In another study, 56%
of geneticists reported that they felt data withholding was harming
the education of students and postdoctoral fellows. 25 2
There is additional evidence linking the patenting of academic
research to a diminution in sharing knowledge. An analysis of
patent-paper pairs showed a reduction in scientific literature
citations once a corresponding patent is granted.253 Another study
of patenting activity and publication activity among academics
reported a modest anti-commons effect in the field of
biotechnology. 25 4 An anti-commons problem occurs when a large
number of patent holders exist in a single field, making it difficult
248 Merz et al., supra note 155, at 578.
249 Vogeli et al., supra note 238, at 131-32.
2 50 Id. at 131.
251 Id.
252 Campbell et al., supra note 155, at 478.
253 Fiona Murray & Scott Stem, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights
Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-
Commons Hypothesis 673 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
W1 1465, 2005).
254 Huang & Murray, supra note 190, at 1214 (2009).
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to negotiate and obtain all the necessary rights for follow-on
research.255
As noted by Timothy Caulfield, a law professor at the
University of Alberta, there is "substantial empirical evidence that
university researchers are becoming more secretive and less
willing to share research results or materials."256 One study that
surveyed biomedical researchers reported that 19% of recent
requests were not fulfilled, that failures to supply materials are
increasing, and that one out of six respondents had a project
delayed owing to a lack of timely access to research materials.257
Another study shows that secrecy is rampant in universities and the
withholding of information is harmful.258
Among life scientists, geneticists appear to be withholding
data, information, and materials the most. Nearly half of all
geneticists who requested information, data, or materials related to
published research from another academic were denied access.25 9
The consequences of this withholding of data, information, and
material reported by geneticists included: detracted somewhat or
greatly from the level of communication in science (77%), slowed
rate of research progress (73%), harmed the quality of peer
relationship (63%), termination of collaborations (28%),
abandoned promising line of research (21%), delayed reciprocal
requests, (18%) and refusal to respond to reciprocal requests
(130%).260 Thirty-five percent of the geneticists believed sharing of
research materials had decreased over the 1990s.2 61
255 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 92, at 698.
256 Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene
Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006)
(citing Campbell et al., supra note 155; John P. Walsh & Wei Hong, Secrecy is
Increasing in Step with Competition, 422 NATURE 801 (2003); JM Grushcow,
Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System Revealed, 33 J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 59 (2004); Vogeli et al., supra note 238; Prevalences and Predictors,
supra note 238).
257 John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers,
309 SCIENCE 2002, 2002 (2005).
25 Vogeli et al., supra note 238, at 133.
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While this increasing secrecy could be due to many reasons,
evidence shows a correlation between proprietary interests and
secrecy. One study showed that scientists who directly engaged in
the commercialization of their research were twice as likely to
refuse to share information as those doing basic work.2 62
Most important to the accuracy and credibility of scientific
research, the refusal to share prevents replication and verification
of experimental data. A study that surveyed geneticists reported
that 28% were unable to duplicate published research because
other academic scientists refused to share data, information, or
materials .263
2. Effects of Academic Researchers' Lack of Awareness of the
Potential Impact ofPatents
If researchers correctly realized that these patents could be
applied against them, the negative effect of gene patents on
research would be even greater. There is considerable evidence
that researchers underestimate the reach of gene patents and
mistakenly think that the United States has a general research
exemption. 264 Only 5% of academic researchers bother to regularly
check for patents and others routinely infringe patents. 265 Many
academic researchers ignore patents. 266 It has been suggested that
there is a "general lack of awareness or concern among
investigators about existing intellectual property." 267 However, this
cultural view is not grounded in the law 2 68 and such a false sense of
262 Prevalences and Predictors, supra note 238, at 140-42.
263 Campbell et al., supra note 155, at 478.
264 Gaisser et al., supra note 104, at 408.
265 Walsh et al., supra note 257.
266 Gaisser et al., supra note 104, at 407-08.
267 HANSEN ET AL., supra note 157; STEPHEN A. MERRILL AND ANNE-MARIE
MAZZA, eds., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH
(National Academies Press: Washington D.C. 2006).
268 In Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Circuit restricted the common
law research exemption to activities that are "solely for amusement, to satisfy
idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry." Madey v. Duke University,
307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). This
exemption does not cover research that is conducted "in furtherance of the
alleged infringer's legitimate business," including the business of education at a
university. Id. at 1362-63. Thus, a researcher will be liable for infringement
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confidence could be leading many researchers to ignore patents
simply because they currently fear no repercussions. If a highly-
publicized suit were brought against a researcher, then researchers
might change their behavior dramatically. But when some gene
patent holders threaten researchers and force them to stop their
research, they often obtain a confidentiality agreement from the
researchers and their universities as a condition for not pursuing
damage actions for uses the researcher already made of the gene
sequence. Thus, other scientific researchers may not adequately be
assessing the implications of patents for their own research.
There is a persistent belief among many academic researchers
that they are shielded from liability for patent infringement,
perhaps because their work is largely funded by the government
and generally produces no immediate commercial revenue.26 9 This
might explain the contradictory results of some studies. Some
studies report that 49% of geneticists have limited research due to
gene patents,27 0 but others suggest that only 1% felt that a patent
had caused them to delay a project, and none reported abandoning
a project because of a patent.271 The majority of researchers
surveyed in the latter study were doing basic science research,
primarily in the fields of genomics or proteomics, whereas about
10% of those surveyed worked on drug discovery, diagnostic test
development, or clinical testing.272 Only 5% (18 of 379) of the
academic researchers in the study regularly checked for patents
related to their research and only 5% were made aware of
unless her infringing acts fit within the narrow exemption recognized in Madey
or within an exemption that Congress explicitly created by statute. See, e.g.,
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (applying the
exemption found in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
269 See, e.g., Misha Angrist & Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Who Owns the
Genome?, 11 NEW ATLANTIS 87, 94 (2006) (stating that purportedly
"contradictory" statements in the law have led "academic genome researchers
[to] feel more protected from litigation" than they actually are); Caulfield et al.,
supra note 256, at 1092 (noting that researchers continue to "operate in a patent-
dense environment, without the benefit of a clear research exemption").
270 Rabino, supra note 123, at 15.
271 Caulfield et al., supra note 256, at 1092 (citing Walsh et al., supra note
257).
272 WALSH ET AL., supra note 238, at 10.
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intellectual property related to their research through a
notification.273 The remaining respondents reported doing research
to develop research tools or were engaged in other research
activities .274
Just because patent litigation against basic science researchers
has been infrequent in the past does not mean it will remain so in
the future because patent holders have the legal right to sue anyone
for infringing conduct. Already, "[s]uch routine forbearance [by
patent holders] does not apply to the genetics and diagnostics
industries, and thus for the patents of concern here the costs to
innovation, competition, and medical care are truly serious."27 5
In 2002, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Madey v.
Duke University276 clarified the common law research exemption.
The court held that the research exemption was limited to activities
that are "solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry." 277 It might be reasonable to expect
that academic researchers' awareness of patents would have
increased after the Madey case, but a study found only a small
increase to 5% of academic respondents looking for patents related
to their field since that decision. 27 8 However, their employers-the
academic research institutions-were paying increased attention to
patent concerns. 27 9 Twenty-two percent of academic researchers
were notified by their institutions to be careful with respect to
patents on research inputs. 28 0 This was an increase from 15% of
academic researchers that had received notifications from their
institutions five years previously.28 1 The notifications by the
institutions seemed to have little effect upon the academic
researchers, however, with only 5.9% of those notified by their
273 Walsh et al., supra note 257.
274 WALSH ET AL., supra note 238, at 10.
275 Angrist & Cook-Deegan, supra note 269.
276 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
277 Id. at 1362.
278 WALSH ET AL., supra note 238, at 8. Prior to the decision, 3% of
researchers looked for such patents. Id.
279 Id.
2 80 Id. at 16.
281 Id.
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institution "regularly checking patents" compared to 4.5% of those
not notified by their institution regularly checking patents.282 It
seems even direct warnings do little to increase researchers'
sensitivity to potential patent infringement liability.
To the extent that some university professors are undertaking
research on genes without the consent of the patent holder, they
may unwittingly be exposing themselves to costly patent
infringement liability. If the unapproved researcher does discover,
say, a gene therapy, the holder of the gene patent can prevent the
researcher from marketing it or can demand a huge royalty.283 If the
subsequent researchers actually understood this possibility, there
would be less incentive for them to develop innovative cures-the
sort of invention that is legitimately protected by patent law.
3. Effects of Gene Patents on People's Willingness to Participate
in Genetic Research and Donate Biological Samples For
Research
Gene patents deter volunteers from participating in medical
research. Potential research subjects are less likely to participate in
research if they are aware that their participation in research might
lead to patents that ultimately increase the cost of their health care
and negatively affect their quality of healthcare. In a study of
potential research subjects, 32% of those surveyed said they would
be offended if research conducted with their own tissue was used
for patenting of products.2 8 4
282 Id.
283 As attorney Barbara A. Caulfield of Affymetrix, Inc., a gene chip
company, has stated, DNA-based science has not yet spawned widely-
marketable products. Once that occurs, patent owners will not hesitate to block
infringing research. When Caulfield spoke at a July 2007 seminar of the
Genetics & Public Policy Center, she noted that patent owners become litigious
"very, very quickly when there's money involved." GENETICS & PUB. POL'Y
CENTER, WHO OwNS YOUR GENES? INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE HUMAN
GENOME 17 (2007), available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/Patenting
GenePOPStranscript.pdf; see also Gary Stix, Owning the Stuff of Life, 294 SCI.
AM. 76, 82 (2006).
284 Jon F. Merz & Pamela Sankar, DNA Banking: An Empirical Study of a
Proposed Consent Form, in STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LEGAL &
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 198, 211 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1998).
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Human genes are different than other patentable inventions.
They are parts of people, raising individual rights issues about
granting companies monopolies over their use. A person's genetic
information can be a key source of self-understanding and a
powerful tool for diagnosing or treating diseases of that person or
his or her children. However, issuing a patent to the researcher
who first identifies a version of the gene can impede medical
diagnostics and the search for further mutations and treatments and
can prevent a person from learning genetic information about
himself or herself.
Refusal by a gene patent holder to allow another laboratory to
perform a test can have dire consequences. Long QT syndrome is a
disorder of the heart's electrical system that is characterized by
irregular heart rhythms and a risk of sudden death.285 The
University of Utah obtained multiple patents on the genes
associated with the disease and granted an exclusive license to
DNA Sciences.286 GeneDx had also developed testing for the
disorder.287 GeneDx was sued for infringement and prohibited from
offering its tests even though the exclusive license holder was not
ready to offer a test.288 Meanwhile, the exclusive license changed
hands twice as DNA Sciences' assets were acquired by the
company Genaissance, which was in turn acquired by the company
Clinical Data, Inc.28 9 For two years, diagnostic testing was not
offered for long QT syndrome despite GeneDx's capability and
285 Stifling or Stimulating-The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic
Testing: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 39 (2007) (prepared
statement of Dr. Marc Grodman, founder and Chief Executive Officer of Bio-
Reference Laboratories, Inc.) [hereinafter Stifling or Stimulating].
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Stifling or Stimulating, supra note 285 (statement of Dr. Marc Grodman,
CEO of Bio-Reference Laboratories, Inc.).
289 Genaissance Pharmaceuticals Signs Amendment to License Agreement for
Patents on Genes Associated With Sudden Cardiac Death Syndrome, PR
NEWSWIRE (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.advfn.com/news
Genaissance-Pharmaceuticals-Signs-Amendment-to-License-Agreement-for-
Patents-on 7512932.html; Clinical Data Completes Acquisition of Genaissance
Pharamaceuticals, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct. 7, 2005), available at http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m0ein/is 2005 Oct 7/ai nl5678886.
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willingness to offer the test. During this period at least one patient,
age ten, died from her undiagnosed long QT syndrome, which
could have been prevented had testing been available.2 90
Numerous studies show that the public willingness to donate
tissue samples depends on how or by whom their sample will be
used.2 91 The public generally has a positive attitude toward
participating in research, but this attitude is based on trust.2 92 Many
studies show how trust is an important factor affecting a person's
willingness to participate in research.2 93 Potential research
participants consider the commercial interest in research and uses
of tissue an important issue when deciding whether to participate
in research.2 94 These studies also show that willingness to provide
specimens for genetic research hinges on trust between the donor
and the researcher.2 95
290 Stifling or Stimulating, supra note 285.
291 See Briana Mezuk et al., Participant Characteristics That Influence
Consent for Genetic Research in a Population-Based Survey: The Baltimore
Epidemiologic Catchment Area Follow-up, 11 CMTY. GENETICS 171, 173
(2008); see also Conrad V. Fernandez et al., Knowledge and Attitudes of
Pregnant Women with Regard to Collection, Testing and Banking of Cord Blood
Stem Cells, 168 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 695, 695 (2003); Paul R. Helft et al.,
Cancer Patients' Attitudes Toward Future Research Uses of Stored Human
Biological Materials, 2 J. OF EMPIRICAL RES. ON HUM. RES. ETHICS 15, 18
(2007).
292 See S. C. Hull et al., Patients' Views On Identifiability of Samples and
Informed Consent for Genetic Research, 8 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 62, 66 (2008);
Asa Kettis-Lindblad et al., Genetic Research and Donation of Tissue Samples to
Biobanks, What do Potential Sample Donors in the Swedish General Public
Think?, 16 EUR. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 433, 435-36 (2005); Thomas Malone et al.,
High Rate of Consent to Bank Biologic Samples for Future Research: The
Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group Experience, 94 J. OF THE NAT'L CANCER
INST. 769, 770 (2002); M. Wilcox & S. Schroer, The Perspective of Patients
with Vascular Disease on Participation in Clinical Trials, 12 J. OF VASCULAR
NURSING 112, 113 (1994).
293 Wilcox & Schroer, supra note 292; Hull et al., supra note 292; Kettis-
Lindblad, supra note 292; Malone et al., supra note 292.
294 See Klaus Hoeyer et al., The Ethics ofResearch Using Biobanks: Reason to
Question the Importance Attributed to Informed Consent, 165 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MED. 97, 98 (2005).
295 See Malone et al., supra note 292; see also Kettis-Lindblad et al., supra
note 292, at 435.
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According to another study, a significant number of
participants would not like their samples used in research funded
by entities with commercial interests. For example, a significant
minority of people (29.3%) surveyed were against their stored
tissue being used by drug or pharmaceutical companies.2 96 In
another study, 18.7% said that their decision to participate would
be affected by whether funding was provided by a private company
versus a public or independent source.2 97 A third study reported that
54.9% of respondents considered corporate interests in the research
an important issue in the decision whether to participate in a study,
while 14.1o% ranked this as the most important issue.2 98
In addition to the negative impact that gene patents have on
innovation, the possibility of patenting genes has caused some
physicians and university researchers to view patients as treasure
troves. Doctors, health care institutions, researchers, and hospitals
have gone to court to gain ownership of patients' cell lines, tissue,
and genes in order to commercialize them, even over the patients'
objections.2 99 Genetic research is being undertaken on people
without their consent as researchers prospect for genes.
VI. CONCLUSION
What if each generation of scientists was forbidden to use-or
even think about-the theorems, principles, and natural
phenomena that had been discovered or proven by the previous
generation of scientists? In order to assure that does not happen, a
patentability analysis under the Progress Clause requires courts to
weigh "how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the
contribution of the inventor." 30 0 Indeed, "the reason for the
exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can impede
296 However, approximately two-thirds or 62.6% believed it was "all right" for
their tissue samples to be used in profit-motivated research. Helft et al., supra
note 291, at 18.
297 Kettis-Lindblad et al., supra note 292, at 435.
298 Hoeyer et al., supra note 294.
299 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
300 Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303
(2012).
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rather than 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' "301
In O'Reilly v. Morse, the Court held that by patenting all uses of
electromagnetism to produce characters at a distance, "while he
shuts the door against inventions of other persons, the patentee
would be able to avail himself of new discoveries in the properties
and powers of electro-magnetism which scientific men might bring
to light."3 02 In the case of a gene patent, the patent holder can
improperly avail himself or herself of all later discoveries related
to genetic diagnosis and treatments, disproportionate to its efforts.
Recently, the Supreme Court decided a trio of cases that
re-invigorate the Constitutional foundation for the patent system.
The Justices have taken to heart the Constitutional mandate that the
patent system "promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts."3 03 In Bilski v. Kappos,3 04 the Court harkened back to Thomas
Jefferson's idea that "[t]he underlying policy of the patent system
[is] that 'the things which are worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent,' . . . must outweigh the
restrictive effect of the limited patent monopoly."3 05 The Bilski
decision emphasized that, under the U.S. Constitution and Section
101, the Court is "careful in interpreting the Patent Act to
'determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all
to use.' In particular, the Court has long held that '[p]henomena of
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable' under § 101," because
such patents "would 'wholly pre-empt' the public's access to the
'basic tools of scientific and technological work.' "306 In Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Court
similarly noted that "the grant of a patent might tend to impede
innovation more than it would tend to promote it."307 In
301 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
302 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853).
303 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
304 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
305 Id. at 3258 (Breyer, J., concurring) (indicating where the Justices were in
agreement) (citation omitted).
306 Id.
307 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1293 (2012).
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Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the
Court acknowledged that patents might "imped[e] the flow of
information that might permit, indeed spur, invention." 3 08
The Supreme Court is concerned with drawing the boundaries
of subject matter eligibility, holding that laws of nature and
products of nature are not patentable, in order to eliminate " 'the
enormous potential for rent seeking that would be created if
property rights could be obtained in them and ... the enormous
transaction costs that would be imposed on would-be users.' "309
Patents on human genes overcompensate the patent owner for
merely discovering natural information, such as gene mutations'
correlation with disease, while allowing them to tax any user of the
natural information. While all patents have the power to create
short term costs, such as excluding others from using the invention,
increasing the cost of using the invention or blocking
improvements/creation of new technologies based on the invention
and systemic patent thicket/anticommons effects, there is evidence
that gene patents have already created inefficiencies in healthcare
delivery, increased research costs and prevented research projects
altogether. 3 10
308 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2116 (2013) (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305).
309 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302 (quoting WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305-06
(Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2003)).
310 SEC'Y ADVISORY COMM., supra note 109, at 33 (2010); Powell et al., supra
note 152, at S90, S91; Berthels et al., supra note 101, at 1114; Chandrasekharan
& Fiffer, supra note 104, at S184; Angrist et al., supra note 155, at S118;
Blanton, supra note 155, at 10; Supplemental Declaration of Ellen Matloff,
supra note 155, at 6-8; Declaration of Haig H. Kazazian, supra note 155, at
7-11; Declaration of Arupa Ganguly, supra note 155, at 3-14; Declaration
of Debra Leonard, supra note 155, at 19; Declaration of Elizabeth Swisher,
supra note 155, at 14-21; Declaration of Mildred Cho, supra note 155, at
2, 9-16, 24; Declaration of Madhuri Hegde, supra note 155, at 6-12;
Declaration of Harry Ostrer supra note 155, at 10, 12-14; Declaration of
David Ledbetter, supra note 155, at 13-24; Mildred Cho et al., supra note
155, at 5, 7; Merz et al., supra note 155, at 577; see also Rabino, supra note 123,
at 15; Campbell et al., supra note 155, at 478; Schissel et al., supra note 110, at
118.
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The analyses of studies related to gene patents demonstrate
how patents on products of nature, laws of nature, and abstract
ideas can impede innovation. Consequently, the underlying goals
of the Progress Clause are served by the Myriad decision which
continued to exempt these items from patentability.
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